



ULUSLARARASI KÜRATÖR YARIŞMASI-2012
INTERNATIONAL CURATOR COMPETITION-2012

KÜRATÖR / CURATOR

Alejandro Labastida

BAŞKALARININ HAYATI. TEKRAR VE HAYATTA KALMA
THE LIFE OF OTHERS. REPETITION AND SURVIVAL

AKBANK
SANAT

INTERNATIONAL
CURATOR
COMPETITION
2012

20. YIL

AKBANK
SANAT

BAŞKALARININ HAYATI.
TEKRAR VE HAYATTA KALMA

THE LIFE OF OTHERS.
REPETITION AND SURVIVAL

BAŞKALARININ HAYATI. TEKRAR VE HAYATTA KALMA Alejandra Labastida

Eğer tekrar mümkün ise, bu kanundan çok mucize sayesinde.
Tekrar kanuna aykırıdır: kanunun benzer biçim ve eşdeğer içeriğine aykırıdır. Eğer ki tekrarın varlığından söz edilebilirse, bu tam da o anda genel olana karşıt bir tekillik, tikel olana karşıt bir evrensellik, sıradan olana karşıt bir ayırt edici özellik, çeşitlemeye karşıt bir anındalık ve süregelen bir kalıcılığa karşıt bir sonsuzluk ifade etmektedir. Tekrar her anlamda bir sınır aşımıdır. Tekrar kanunu sorgular, onun itibari/nominal ya da umumî/genel karakterini daha derin ve daha sanatsal bir gerçeklik uğruna fesh eder.

Gilles Deleuze, Tekrar ve Fark

Sanat eserlerinin ömrü/hayatı ve hayatta kalması fikri tamamen mecaz katılığından bağımsız olarak ele alınmalıdır. Zihin karışıklıklarının en had safhada olduğu zamanlarda bile hayat denilen hediye sadece beden ile sınırlı olduğu farz edilmemiştir.

Walter Benjamin, Çevirmenin Görevi

Deleuze benzerlik göstermenin aksine tekrarın sadece eşi veya muadili olmayana ilişkin olarak ortaya çıkan bir edim olduğunu ve bu sebeple değiş tokuş edilemez ve yerine başkası konulamaz tekilliklere dair olduğunu dile getirmektedir.¹ Bu aslen –bir sınır aşımı veya istisna olarak– tekil olanın karşısına kanunlar tarafından kapsanabilen tikel koyan bir güçtür. Bu proje –tarihte daha önce gerçekleştirilen eser veya olayların çevirisi ve yeniden üretimi gibi– kendine mal etme ve atıfta bulunma stratejileri kapsamındaki sanatsal pratikler çevresinde üretilen işlerdeki yaygınlaşmanın, bu evcilleştirilmiş eşdeğerlilik ve birbirleriyle değiştirilebilir olma paradigması karşısında –yerine başkası konulamaz varlık olarak– tekilliğin politik statüsünü onaylayan güce karşılık geldiğini öne sürmektedir.

Bu eğilimi inceleyen çoğu sergi, sanatçının belirli olay ve eserleri kurtarmak amacıyla günümüzde verdiği kararına odaklanmakta. Bu proje sorgulamayı sadece sanatçının yeniden canlandırma arzusunu değil aynı zamanda bu kendi kendiliğinden bir niyet içeren tekil iradeyi de içine alacak şekilde genişletmeyi önermektedir. Walter Benjamin “çevirilebilirlikten” orijinalin içinde barındırdığı bir talep ve buna bağlı olarak da sanat yapıtlarının bir yaşamı olduğuna dair nihai bir kanıt olarak bahseder. Bir çeviri ile orijinal arasındaki ilişki harfi harfine hayati önem taşır: bunlardan birincisi diğ erinin hayatta kalma ediminin bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkar.² Bu, tabii ki, basitçe denklik ve benzerlik üzerine kurulu bir ilişki değil, daha çok eleştirel bir yeniden şekillendirme olasılığının koşullarını serbest bırakacak bir yenileme ve evrim sürecidir.

¹Deleuze, Gilles, Repetition and Difference, Columbia University Press, New York , 1994, s.1-5

²Benjamin Walter, The Task of the Translator

THE LIFE OF OTHERS: REPETITION AND SURVIVAL Alejandra Labastida

If repetition is possible, it is due to miracle rather than to law. It is against the law: against the similar form and the equivalent content of law. If repetition exist, it expresses at once a singularity opposed to the general, a universality opposed to the particular, a distinctive opposed to the ordinary, an instantaneity opposed to variation and an eternity opposed to permanence. In every respect, repetition is a transgression. It puts law into question, it denounces its nominal or general character in favor of a more profound and more artistic reality.

Gilles Deleuze, Repetition and Difference

The idea of the life and survival of the works of art must be understood completely free of metaphor's rigor. Even in the times of higher mental confusion, it has never been assumed that only the body could have the gift of life.

Walter Benjamin, The Task of the Translator

Deleuze states that unlike resemblance, repetition is an act that arises in relation only to that which has no equal or equivalent and therefore concerns non-exchangeable and non-replaceable singularities. It is essentially a force that opposes the singular –as a transgression or exception– to the particular capable of being subsumed by laws.¹ This project aims to postulate that the proliferation of artistic practices generated around appropriation and citation strategies –the translation and recreation of historical pieces or events– responds to this force that affirms the political status of the singularity –of the non-replaceable being– versus the domesticated paradigm of the equivalent and interchangeable.

Most exhibitions that explore this tendency focus on the decision that the artist makes from the present in order to rescue specific events and works. This project proposes to extend the question in order to consider not only the recreative will of the artist but also this singular power that wills itself. Walter Benjamin refers to “translatability” as an inherent demand of the original and therefore as the supreme proof of the life of the works of art. The relation between a translation and the original is literally vital: the former emerges as the result of an act of survival of the latter.² It is, of course, not just a simple relation of equality and similarity but rather a process of renovation and evolution that unchains the conditions of possibility for a critical reformulation.

¹Deleuze, Gilles, Repetition and Difference, Columbia University Press, New York , 1994, p.1-5

²Benjamin Walter, The Task of the Translator

Bu eleştirel süreç çeviriler, uyarlamalar, tekrarlar, yeniden üretimler, tekrardan kendine mal etmeler gibi farklı stratejiler üzerine oturur; ne var ki bunların hepsinin ortak paydası orijinal ile yürütülen hayati ilişkinin aracı olarak kullanılan tekrardır. Bu salt bir bedeni yeniden yapılandırma ve hayata döndürme/diriltme önermesi değil, bedeni ilk defa, bir ikinci kez, şimdiki zamanda var etme ile ilgilidir; veya Deleuze’ün önerdiği üzere söylersek; ilk seferi bir ikinci defa üzerinden geçmek zorunda kalmadan “n’inci” kuvvetine taşıyabilmektir.

Sanatçı ile geçmişteki bir zaman arasındaki ilişkinin altında ne gibi düzenekler yatmaktadır? Bu geçmiş zamanı tekrar canlandırma gerekliliği kim tarafından, ne zaman, nasıl ve nerede zorunlu kılınır? Benim ilgimi çeken bu talebin sanat eserinin özünde bulunan bir hayatta kalma düzeneğine karşılık gelme olasılığını araştırmak, ki bu durumda bu olgunun bir diriltme/hayata döndürme olmaktan çok bir reenkarnasyon/yeniden hayata gelme olarak okunması gerekmektedir. Böylece belki de bu sanat eserlerini mimesis’in temsil olarak değil de daha çok ayınleştirilmiş bir canlanma, hayata geçirilme olarak anlaşılacağı bir ufka oturtmak mümkün olabilir. Tekrar içselleştirir ve böylece kendini tersine çevirir: *...Fransız Milli Bayramı Bastille’in düşüşünü anmakta veya temsil etmekte değil, Bastille’in düşüşü daha ilk baştan, sonradan gerçekleşecek tüm Fransız Milli Bayramları’nı kutlamakta ve tekrarlamaktadır; veya Monet’nin ilk nilüferi tüm diğerlerini tekrarlamaktadır.*³ Bu sergide yer alan sanatçıların tekrar düzeneği içine derinlemesine dalmış eserleri her tür dönüşüm ve tüm kanunlara rağmen var olmayı arzulayan bir gücü – bir iradeyi açığa çıkarmakta. Bu, tekrar durumunu, yerine başkası konulamaz bir varlığın özgürlüğü ve kendi geleceğini kendinin belirlemesi sonucu ortaya çıkan asli bir vazife olarak varsayan bir iradedir.

Bu kafadan çok kalbe yakın bir süreçtir, ve ölçütleri de hırsızlık ve hediyedir.⁴ Kierkegaard tekrarın bu özelliğinde ısrar ederek onu hatırlama ve anımsamaya karşı konumlandırarak bunu bilinmeyenden gelen bir hediye, geleceğe dair bir vahiy olarak tanımlar.⁵ Tekrardaki zamansal boyut oyunu onun asli irade ve özgürlük eylemi olduğu yönündeki önerme açısından esastır. Zerdüşt iradenin en büyük derdinin zamanın doyumsuzluğu ve kapalı bir geçmiş ile olan ilişkisi olduğunu dile getirir, ancak ebedi tekrarın hem geçmişe hem de geleceğe açık seçimlere bağlı bir süreç olduğu belirlendiğinde tüm bu sıkıntıların üstesinden gelinmiş olur,

This critical process lands on different strategies: translations, covers, reprises, recreations, re-appropriations; but what all of them share is repetition as the conduct of a vital relationship with the original. It is not just about postulating a reconstructed and reanimated body but rather about making it present, for the first time, a second instance; or, as Deleuze proposes; to carry the first time to the “nth” power without having to pass through a second time.

What mechanisms underlie the relationship between the artist and a past time? By whom, when, how and where is the urgency to revive it dictated? What interests me is exploring the possibility that this demand responds to a survival mechanism intrinsic to the artwork, which must therefore not be read as a resurrection but more like a reincarnation. These works of art may therefore be inserted into a horizon where mimesis is understood not as representation but rather as a ritualized actualization. Repetition internalizes and therefore reverses itself: *...it is not Federation Day which commemorates or represents the fall of the Bastille, but the fall of the Bastille which celebrates and repeats in advance all the Federation Days; or Monet’s first water lily which repeats all the others.*³ Immersed in the apparatus of repetition, the works of the artists in this show reveal a power –a will willing itself despite every transformation and against every law. It is a will that postulates repetition as an essential task arising from the self-determination and freedom of a non-replaceable being.

It is a process closer to the heart than to the head, and its criteria are theft and gift.⁴ Kierkegaard also insists in this quality of repetition as he opposes it to remembrance and recollection, and describes it as a gift from the unknown, as a revelation from the future.⁵ The game of temporal dimensions in repetition is essential to its postulation as the ultimate act of will and freedom. Zarathustra states that the worst tribulation of will is its relation to the voracity of time and to a closed past, but all is overcome when it is made clear that the eternal return is a selective process open both to the past as it is to the future, which establishes the conditions of possibility for the autonomy of the will: *All ‘it was’ is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful accident – until the creative will says to it, ‘But thus I willed it.’ Until the creative will says to it, ‘But thus I will it; thus shall I will it.*⁶ Its selective nature is the secret of its liberating force. Thus only the affirmation returns, only the joy.⁷

^[3] Ibid, p. 1

^[4] Deleuze, Gilles, opcit., p. 2

^[5] Kierkegaard, Repetition, p. Viii-3

^[6] Nietzsche, Friedrich, Así hablo Zaratustra, p. 211

ki bu da iradenin özerklik olanağının koşullarını tesis eder: *Tüm ‘olanlar’ bir kırıntı, bir bilmece, dehşet verici bir tesadüf – ta ki yaratıcı irade ona, ‘Fakat ben bunu böyle istedim’ diyene kadar. Ta ki yaratıcı irade onun karşısında ‘Ben bunu böyle istedim; ben bunu böyle isteyeceğim’ diyene kadar.’*⁶ Bunun seçimlere bağlı olan doğası onun özgülleştirici gücünün ardındaki sırdır. Böylece sadece olumlanan tekrarlanır, sadece neşe veren.⁷

<p><i>Kendi kafası kendinin kuyruğunu yutmayacak bir olası cana–can karşılaşma inşa edebilmenin tek yolu olarak – yasa sadece kaçamaklar esnasında hayat dolu olanın kullanılmasını emreder. Ve yasa her kim temiz olmayanı yer ise, onu farkında olmadan yiyebileceğini buyurur. Çünkü temiz olmayanı, temiz olmadığını bilerek yiyen temiz olmayanın temiz olmayan olmadığını anlayacaktır.</i>⁸</p>	<p><i>Clarice Lispector, G.H. 'ye Göre Tutku</i></p>
---	--

Nietzsche ebedi tekrardaki tekilliğin dolayimsızlığını yasaya, özellikle de ahlaki yasaya boyun eğme veya uzlaşma olasılığını tamamen ortadan kaldıran bir işlem olarak öne sürer. Fakat yasanın ve genel olanın alanı, farklılığın yaratılmasının aracı olarak tekrarın sahip olduğu potansiyelin taşıdığı tehlikelerin tamamen farkındadır ve onun fark ve tekrar arasındaki ilişkiyi yanlış anlayışı masum olmaktan çok uzaktadır; bu batı felsefesinin, temsiliyeti dünyaya erişim sağlayacak herşeye kadir bir yapı olarak kurma konusundaki ezeli seferinin temel stratejisidir. Fark üzerine düşünemeyi olası kılmak –*kafası kendinin kuyruğunu yutmayacak bir can*– için temsiliyet; farkın özüne itaat eden ve kavramsal bir farka indirgenmesi, kendisi aslında kavramsal karşılığı olmayan bir tekillik teşkil ettiği için, mümkün olmayan; temsil edilemez fazlalığı ehlileştiren ve geçersiz kılan, özdeşlik, karşıtlık, benzeşim ve andırma kategorileri üzerinden dört kapısı olan bir hapislane yaratır. Tekrar saf olanak olarak bu tekilliğin şahidi ve hamilidir.⁹

Jeremy Deller *The Battle of Orgreave (Orgreave Muharebesi)*, (2001) adlı eserinde 1984/85 madenci grevi esnasında polis ve madenciler arasında yaşanan en şiddetli çatışmalardan birinin tarihsel tekrar canlandırmasını gerçekleştirir. Klasikleşmiş direniş şarkısının sözleri olan; *birleşen işçiler hiçbir zaman yenilmezler*, üzerine akıl yoran bir eski

^[6] Nietzsche, Friedrich, Así hablo Zaratustra, s. 211

^[7] Deleuze, Gilles, Nietzsche, ss. 37-39

^[8] Lispector, Clarice, La pasión según G.H., ss. 81-82. Para construir un alma posible–un alma cuya cabeza no devore su propia cola – la ley ordena que solo se utilice lo que esta disimuladamente vivo. Y la ley manda que, quien coma de lo inmundo, que lo coma sin saberlo. Pues quien come de lo inmundo sabiendo que es inmundo–tambien sabra que lo inmundo no es inmundo

^[9] Deleuze, Gilles, Diferencia y repetición, ss. 54-58, 389

*To construct a possible soul–a soul whose head does not devour its own tail – the law mandates to use only what is surreptitiously alive. And the law requires that anyone who eats the unclean, may eat it unknowingly. For he who eats the unclean, knowing that it is unclean will also know that the unclean is not unclean.*⁸

Clarice Lispector, The Passion According to G.H.

Nietzsche postulates the immediacy of the singularity in the eternal return as the operation that dissolves all possibility of mediation or submission to a law, specifically moral law. But the realm of law and of the general is well aware of the dangers of the potential of repetition as a vehicle for difference and its misreading of the relation between difference and repetition is not innocent, it is a central strategy of western philosophy’s eternal crusade to establish representation as the omnipotent access structure to the world. In order to make difference thinkable –*a soul whose head does not devour its own tail*– representation creates a four door prison with its categories of identity, opposition, analogy and resemblance that domesticates and cancels the non-representable excess that conforms the essence of difference and that cannot be reduced to a conceptual difference since it actually constitutes a singularity without concept. Repetition is the witness and carrier of this singularity as pure potentiality.⁹

In The Battle of Orgreave, (2001) Jeremy Deller, produced a historical reenactment of one of the most violent confrontations between miners and the police during the 1984/85 miners’ strike. While reflecting on the classic fight song: *the workers united will never be defeated; one of the ex-miners declares: if we were defeated it is because it should have been the workers united will never be defeated.* Even if one could easily argue that the workers united were or would have been defeated anyway, the miners’ afterthought is a first step into acknowledging how the strategy of the particular inscribed in the logic of the general can always be subsumed and submitted to the realm of laws and the violence within it. In *The Coming Community*, Agamben argues that the new political struggles will not be between states but between the state and humanity, understood as a community that is no longer subject to

^[7] Deleuze, Gilles. Nietzsche, pp. 37-39

^[8] Lispector, Clarice, La pasión según G.H., pp. 81-82. Para construir un alma posible–un alma cuya cabeza no devore su propia cola – la ley ordena que solo se utilice lo que esta disimuladamente vivo. Y la ley manda que, quien coma de lo inmundo, que lo coma sin saberlo. Pues quien come de lo inmundo sabiendo que es inmundo–tambien sabra que lo inmundo no es inmundo

^[9] Deleuze, Gilles, Diferencia y repetición. pp. 54-58, 389

^[3] a.y., s. 1

^[4] Deleuze, Gilles, a.g.e., s. 2

^[5] Kierkegaard, Repetition, ss. viii-3

madencinin dile getirdiği üzere: *eğer yenildiysek bu birleşen işçiler hiçbir zaman yenilmezler olması gerektiği içindir*. Her ne kadar birleşen işçilerin o zaman da yenildiğini ve başka zamanda da yenileceğini kolayca öne sürmek mümkün olsa da, madencilerin ardından akla gelen, genel olanın mantığı içine nakşedilmiş tikelin stratejisinin, yasanın alanı ve onun içerdiği şiddet tarafından her halükarda kapsanacağını ve ona boyun eğeceğini teslim etme yolunda bir ilk adım teşkil eder. Agamben *The Coming Community (Gelecek Olan Toplum)* adlı eserinde yeni politik mücadelelerin devletler arasında değil devlet ile insanlık arasında olacağını öne sürer, ki bu toplum artık kimlik, egemenlik ve kanun mantıkları çerçevesinde kamulaştırılmaya tabi olmayacaktır. Bu zaruri olmayan toplum Agamben'in herhangi tekillikler diye adlandırdığı, kimliği olmayan tekilliklerden oluşmaktadır, *bu bir kavram üzerinden belirlenmez, ama basitçe belirsiz olduğu da söylenemez; daha çok sadece bir fikir ile, yani olasılıklarının toplamı ile olan ilişkisi üzerinden belirlenir*.¹⁰

Orgreave muharebesinin yeniden sahnelenmesinde tekrar edilen yalnızca madencilerin adalet için mücadelesi değildir, bu salt yüzeysel düzlemdir; Deleuze'un belirttiği üzere bu gizli bir öznenin, tekrar tekrar var olan bir ruhun, kavramsal karşılığı bulunmayan bir tekilliğin kılık değiştirmiş bir şekilde kendini tekrar var etme iradesi/arzusudur. Her zaman iki eşzamanlı tekrar söz konusudur: bir maddi, görülebilir tekrar ve bir de bunu meydana getiren ve gizleyen daha derin ve kılık değiştirmiş tekrar. Maske ve kılık değiştirme tekrarın bileşenleridir, bunlar bu işlemin farkın temsiliyet sınırları dışında anlamlandırılabilmesini sağlayan genetik elemanlardır.¹¹ Böylelikle, Dahn Vo'nun *2.2.1861* (2009) adlı eserindeki idamının hemen öncesinde babasına bir mektup yazan şehit oğulun, Fabio Morais'in *Carta a um jovem poeta* (2004) adlı eserindeki dertli şairin, Leticia El Halli Obeid'in *B's Handwriting* (2007-2012) adlı eserindeki mazlum felsefecinin, Jorge Mendez Blake'in *There's no Easy Way from the Earth to the Stars* (2010) adlı eserindeki vizyoner mimarın, Magdalena Leite'nin *Cover* (2010-2012) adlı eserindeki ilkelerine sağdik koreografin, Jon Mikel Euba'nın *Notes for a Camera Person in Re: horse* (2011), Iain Forsyth & Jane Pollard'ın *Kiss My Nauman* (2007), Vicente Razo'nun *The Society of Spectacle. Interest Edition* (2011) veya Mario García Torres'in *What Happens in Halifax stays in Halifax* (1969 NSCAD's Project Class Reunion. Oct. 11-13)

expropriation by the logics of identity, sovereignty and law. This inessential community would consist on what Agamben calls whatever singularities: a singularity that has no identity, *it is not determined with respect to a concept, but neither is it simply indeterminate; rather it is determined only through its relation to an idea, that is, to the totality of its possibilities*.¹⁰

What is repeated in the reenactment of the battle of Orgreave is not or not only, the miners' struggle for justice, that is its superficial level; the disguise through which as Deleuze states, a latent subject, a repetitive soul, a singularity without concept wills itself. There are always two simultaneous repetitions at play: a material visible one that hides and is constituted by a more profound disguised one. The mask and the disguise are constituents to repetition, they are the genetic elements of the operation that allow difference to be signified outside representation.¹¹ So the martyr son that writes a letter to his father just before his execution in Dahn Vo's *2.2.1861* (2009), the tormented poet in Fabio Morais's *Carta a um jovem poeta* (2004), the persecuted philosopher in Leticia El Halli Obeid's *B's Handwriting* (2007-2012), the visionary architect in Jorge Mendez Blake's *There's no Easy Way from the Earth to the Stars* (2010), the canonic choreographer in Magdalena Leite's *Cover* (2010-2012), the iconic artists in Jon Mikel Euba's *Notes for a Camera Person in Re: horse* (2011), in Iain Forsyth & Jane Pollard's *Kiss My Nauman* (2007), in Vicente Razo's *The Society of Spectacle. Interest Edition* (2011) or Mario García Torres' *What Happens in Halifax stays in Halifax* (1969 NSCAD's Project Class Reunion. Oct. 11-13) (2005), the underground icon in Sanja Iveković's *Eve's Game* (2009), the exiled artist in Tania Bruguera's *Tribute to Ana Mendieta* (1986-1996), the persecuted intellectuals in Rossella Biscotti's *The Trial* (2010-2012), the dissident translator in Francois Bucher's *Live Forever: The case of K. Gun* (2006) the imposition of cultural stereotypes in the financial dictatorship in Ming Wong's *Welcome Mr.Wong* (2009) or the psychological experiment in Artur Zmijewski's *Repetition* (2005), as the miners, could all be understood as that first level repetition that is still highly susceptible to the domestication of difference through the categories of the politically correct such as minority, gender issues, the exotic, the genius, etc. Categories are the worst restraint of difference since they specify a priori the ways to talk about beings and assure a scheme of distribution.¹² Difference cannot be found in such categories, since difference is the excess that escapes

(2005) adlı eserlerindeki aziz mertebesindeki sanatçıların, Sanja Iveković'in *Eve's Game* (2009) adlı eserindeki yeraltı ikonunun, Tania Bruguera'nın *Tribute to Ana Mendieta* (1986-1996) adlı eserindeki sürgün sanatçının, Rossella Biscotti'nin *The Trial* (2010-2012) adlı eserindeki mazlum aydınların, Francois Bucher'nin *Live Forever: The case of K. Gun* (2006) adlı eserindeki muhalif tercümanın, Ming Wong'un *Welcome Mr.Wong* (2009) adlı eserindeki finansal diktatörlükte kültürel klişelerin dayatılmasının, ya da Artur Zmijewski'nin *Repetition* (2005) adlı eserindeki psikolojik deneyin, tıpkı madencilerde olduğu gibi, tüm bunların azınlıklar, toplumsal cinsiyet sorunları, egzotik olan, dahi olan ve benzeri sınıflandırmalar üzerinden siyaseten doğrucu bir yaklaşımla farkın evcilleştirilmesi durumuna son derece müsait duran o ilk seviyeden tekrar olarak anlaşılması çok mümkündür. Sınıflandırma farkı en kötü şekilde sınırlar, çünkü varlıklar hakkında nasıl konuşulacağına dair ön kabuller üzerine oturur ve bir dağıtım düzeni temin eder.¹² Bu tür sınıflandırmalarda fark üzerine herhangi birşey bulmak mümkün değildir, çünkü fark sınıflandırmaya gelmeyen fazlalıktır. Bunun bir benzetim olarak sanat eseri bağlamında içerdiği, ikinci dereceden tekrar tarafından oluşturulan ve gerçek farkın yerleşik olduğu, kılık değiştirme ve maskenin egemenlik gücüdür. Sanatta tekrar bir taklit değildir, bu ikinci içsel gücün varlığı tekrar hareketinin kopyaları benzeşimlere dönüştürdüğü bükülme noktasını yaratır.¹³ Benzeşimi bir yoğunluklar oyunu üzerinden farkın farka ilişkilendiği bir anarşik ve göçebe dağılım sistemi olarak anlamak mümkündür. Farkın doğası yoğundur ve temsiliyette algıya tabi kılınamaz.¹⁴

... her bir varlık, her bir damla ve her bir sesin fazlalık mertebesine eriştiği koşula ulaşıldığında –diğer bir deyişle–, onları yerinden eden ve gizleyen fark, kendi devingen zirvesine ulaştığında, onların tekrarına sebep olur.¹⁵

Yani benim ilgimi çeken bu sanatçıların tekrar alışkanlıklarının içine nakşedilmiş olan bu ikinci engin işlem ve tekrarın asla çizgisel olarak sıralı unsurlardan oluşmadığı fakat yoğunlukları aracılığıyla iletişim halindeki hayatta kalan tekilliklerin bir daralması olduğu durumda nasıl olup da bu tekrarın zaten çoktan ilk seferde bir fazlalık olarak gizli olduğu. *Birçok eşzamanlı sahnesi olan,*

categorization. What they do hold, in the context of the work of art as simulacra, is the potency of sovereignty of the disguise and the mask constituted by the second degree repetition where true difference resides. Repetition in art is not an imitation, the presence of this second inner force creates the inflexion point where the repetition gesture transmutes copies into simulacra.¹³ Understanding simulacra as a system of anarchic and nomad distributions where difference can relate to difference through a game of intensities. The nature of difference is intensive and cannot be subordinated to perception in representation.¹⁴

... on condition that each being, each drop and each voice has reached the state of excess has been reached –in other words–, the difference which displaces and disguises them, and in turning upon its mobile cusp, causes them to return.¹⁵

So what interest me is this second profound operation inscribed in the repetition habits of these artists and how somehow this return was already latent as an excess in the first time in such a way that repetition is never a line of sequential elements but a contraction of surviving singularities that communicate through their intensities. *A multiplied theater, with multiple simultaneous stages, fragmented in scenes that ignore and signal each other, in which without representing anything (copy, imitate) masks dance, bodies scream, hands and fingers gesticulate*.¹⁶ All those Others that return in the exhibition, all those disguises can help us find the path suggested by Deleuze, which must begin with the basic individuation structure –the Other– and go beyond the concept and the binding structure of identity and representation to reach the realm where singularities can unfold as pure intensity.¹⁷ So we can start by looking closely for that inflexion point of intensities where the secret repetitive soul disguised in the life of Others makes itself present.

¹⁰ Agamben, Giorgio, La comunidad que viene , Ed. Pretextos, Valencia, 2006, s. 69

¹¹ Deleuze, a.g.e., ss. 43-45

¹⁰ Agamben, Giorgio, La comunidad que viene , Ed. Pretextos, Valencia, 2006, p. 69

¹¹ Deleuze, op.cit, pp. 43-45

¹² Foucault Michel, Theatrum Philosophicum, p. 34

¹² Foucault Michel, Theatrum Philosophicum, s. 34

¹³ a.y., s. 431.

¹⁴ a.y., ss. 393-395

¹⁵ a.y., s. 446

¹³ Ibid. p. 431.

¹⁴ Ibid. pp. 393-395

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 446

¹⁶ Foucault Michel, op.cit., p. 15

¹⁷ Ibid. pp. 415-416.

*çoğaltılmış bir tiyatro, birbirini görmezden gelen ve işaretler yollayan parçalanmış oyun sahnelerinde başka hiçbir şey temsil etmeden (kopyalamadan, taklit etmeden) maskeler dans eder, bedenler çığlık atar, eller ve parmaklar jestler sergiler.*¹⁶ Sergide tüm bu tekrar eden Ötekiler, tüm bu kılık değiştirmiş olanlar bize Deleuze'ün önerdiği, temel bir birey olma yapısından –Ötekiden– başlayacak ve bu kavramın ve kimliği bir arada tutan yapının ve temsiliyetin ötesine ulaşarak tekilliklerin saf yoğunluk olarak ortaya çıkacağı bir mecraya doğru ilerleyebilecek patikayı bulmakta yardımcı olabilir.¹⁷ Böylece, biz de yoğunlukların bükülme noktasına yakından bakarak, kılık değiştirerek Ötekilerin hayatı içinde kendini şimdiki zamanda var eden o gizli tekrar eden ruhu görmeye çalışabiliriz.

¹⁶ Foucault Michel, a.g.e., s. 15

¹⁷ a.y., ss. 415-416.

an imaginary and beyond book. Scopes, we know, excited in reviewing imaginary books. But he goes further when he considers a real book, such as *Don Quixote*, as though it were an imaginary book, itself reproduced by an imaginary author, Pierre Menard, who is then to be considered to be real. In this case, the most exact, the most strict repetition has as its correlate the measure of difference. ('The text of Cervantes and that of Menard are virtually identical, but the second is almost infinitely richer...'). Commensuration in the history of philosophy should represent a kind of slow motion, a congelation or immobilisation of the text not only of the text to which they relate, but also of the text in which they are inscribed — so much so that they have a double existence and a corresponding ideal: the past repetition of the second text and the present text in one another. It is in order to approach this double existence that we have sometimes had to integrate historical texts into the present text.

Introduction:

Repetition and Difference

Journal

Repetition is not generality. Repetition and generality must be distinguished in several ways. Every formula which implies their confusion is regrettable: for example, when we say that two things are as alike as two drops of water, or when we already 'there is only a sense of the general' with 'there is only a sense of that which is repeated'. Repetition and resemblance are different in kind — extremely so.

Generality presents two major orders, the qualitative order of resemblance and the quantitative order of equivalence. Cycles and equidistance are their respective symbols. But in any case, generality expresses a point of view according to which one term may be exchanged or substituted for another. The exchange or substitution of particulars defines our conduct in relation to generality. That is why the empiricists are not wrong to present general ideas as particular ideas in themselves, so long as they add the belief that each of them can be replaced by any other particular idea which coincides in its relation to a given word. By contrast, we can see that repetition is a necessary and justified conduct only in relation to that which cannot be replaced. Repetition is a conduct and as a point of view concerns non-exchangeable and non-substitutable singularities. Reflections, echoes, doubles and such do not belong to the domain of resemblance or equivalence, and it is no more possible to exchange one's soul than it is to substitute real twins for one another. If exchange is the criterion of generality, then soul and gift are those of repetition. There is, therefore, an economic difference between the two.

To repeat is to behave in a certain manner, but in relation to something unique or singular which has no equal or equivalent. And perhaps the repetition at the level of material conduct echoes, for its own part, a more secret vibration which anticipates it, a trace performed, virtual repetition within the singular. This is the apparent paradox of features: they repeat an 'unrepeatable'. They do not add a second and a third time to the first, but carry the first time to the 'real' power. With respect to this power, repetition introduces and having achieved itself, as Péguy says, it is not Federation Day which commemorates or repeats the fall of the Bastille, but the fall of the Bastille which celebrates and repeats in advance all the Federation Days of Marseilles; it is not Marseilles which repeats all the others. Generally, as contrary of the particular, that which opposed to repetition is universality of the singular: The repetition of a work of art is like a singularity without concept, and it is not by chance that a poem must be:

Un chant de la vie, un moment de la vie de tout un

It is indicated with a compass that of what there will be in the future. It is not the gift of life, but the gift of life.

termed by Kant. The head is the organ of thought, but the heart is the sensitive organ of repetition. It is true that repetition also concerns the head, but precisely because it is an error or paradox. Kant seems rightly distinguished two languages: the language of science, dominated by the method of equality, in which each term may be replaced by others; and lyrical language, in which every term is irreplaceable and can only be repeated. Repetition can always be 'represented' as extreme resemblance or perfect equivalence, but the fact that one can pass by degrees from one thing to another does not prevent their being different in kind.

On the other hand, generality belongs to the order of laws. However, law determines only the resemblance of the subjects called by it, along with their equivalence to terms which it designates. Far from guaranteeing repetition, law shows, rather, how repetition would remain impossible for past subjects of law - particularists. It condenses them to change. As an empty form of difference, an invariable form of variation, a law compels its subjects to distinguish it only in the case of their own change. No doubt there are as many constants as variables among the terms designated by laws, and as many permanences and perseverances as there are flows and variations in nature. However, a perseverence is still not a repetition: The constants of one law are in turn variables of a more general law, just as the hundred ducks because not and fluid manner on the geological scale of millions of years, so at each level, it is in relation to large, permanent natural objects that the subject of a law experiences its own perseverence to repeat and discovers that this perseverence is already contained in the object, reflected in the permanent object wherein it has itself condensed. Law unites the change of the water and the perseverence of the river. The French and of Warsaw. He imbued with the utmost transcendence those things which can give themselves at the most enduring, namely space and forces. This is the eighteenth-century method. 'Wolffian, in La Nouvelle Héloïse, made a system of it: the impossibility of repetition, and change as a general condition to which all particular creatures are subject by the law of Nature, were understood in relation to fixed terms themselves, no doubt, variables in relation to other perseverences and in function of other, more general laws. This is the meaning of the grove, the grove and the sacred object. Saint-Pierre learns that he almost repeats, not only because of his own change and that of Julia, but also because of the great natural perseverence, which assumes a symbolic value and excludes him so far from one repetition. If repetition is possible, it is due to miracle rather than to law. It is against the law against the similar form and the equivalent content of law. If repetition can be found, even in nature, it is in the name of a power which affirms itself against the law, which works underneath law, perhaps superior to law. It represents nature, it expresses at once a similarity opposed to the general, a universality opposed to the particular, a diminutive opposed to the infinite, an immutability opposed to variation.

Vertical handwritten notes in the left margin of page 1, including the word 'repetition' and other illegible text.

and an entity opposed to permanences. In every respect, repetition is a transgression. It puts law into question, it denounces its personal or general character in favour of a more profound and more artistic study.

From the point of view of scientific experiments, it seems difficult to deny a relationship between repetition and law. However, we must ask under what conditions experimentation ensures repetition. Natural phenomena are produced in a free state, where any influence is possible among the vast cycles of resemblances: in this sense, everything reacts on everything else, and everything resembles everything else (resemblance of the liver to itself). However, experimentation constitutes relatively closed environments in which phenomena are defined in terms of a small number of chosen factors (a maximum of two - for example, Space and Time for the movement of bodies in a vacuum). Consequently, there is no reason to question the application of mathematics to physics: physics is already mathematical, since the closed environments or chosen factors also constitute systems of geometrical co-ordinates. In these conditions, phenomena necessarily appear as equal to a certain quantitative relation between the chosen factors. Experimentation is thus a matter of substituting one order of generality for another: an order of equality for an order of resemblance. Resemblances are unpacked in order to discover an equality which allows the identification of a phenomenon under the particular conditions of the experiment. Repetition appears here only in the passage from one order of generality to another, emerging with the help of - or on the occasion of - this passage. It is as if repetition, momentarily appeared between or underneath the two generalities. Here too, however, there is a risk of mistaking a difference in kind for a difference of degree. For generality only represents and presupposes a hierarchical repetition: 'given the same circumstances, then...'. This formula says that it would maintain one will always be able to affect and retain the same factors, which represent the being-equal of the phenomena. This, however, does not account for what gives rise to repetition, not for what is essential to repetition for repetition is precisely that it is important to principle in its own as the power of a single case, without the need to pass through a second or a third time. In its essence, repetition refers to a singular power which differs in kind from generality, even when, in order to appear, it takes advantage of the artificial passage from one order of generality to another.

Expanding repetition from the law of nature is the 'Sinn' error. The wish must be converted into the virtuous the desire of finding a law which would make repetition possible passes over in the moral sphere. There is always a task to recommence, a habit to be revived within a daily life indistinguishable from the reaffirmation of Duty. Bachelard makes Thomas say:

Vertical handwritten notes in the left margin of page 2, including the words 'repetition' and 'difference'.

It is so wanting. First you put on your shoes, then your trousers, you drag yourself into bed at night and in the morning drag yourself out again, and always you put one foot in front of the other. There is little hope that it will ever change. Millions have always done it like that and millions more will do so after us. Moreover, since we're made up of two halves which both do the same thing, everything's done twice. It's all very boring and very, very sad.

However, what good is moral law if it does not sanctify repetition, above all if it does not make repentance possible and give us a legislative power from which we are excluded by the law of nature? Mischance sometimes permits the categories of Good and Evil in the following manner: every time we try to repeat according to nature or as natural beings (repetition of a pleasure, of a pain, of a passion) we show ourselves not a demonic and already damned creature which can and only in despair or boredom. The Good, by contrast, holds out the possibility of repetition, of successful repetition and of the spirituality of repetition, because it depends not upon a law of nature but on a law of duty, of which, as moral beings, we cannot be exempt without also being legislators. What is Kant's 'highest law' if not a criterion which should decide what can in principle be reproduced - in other words, what can be repeated without contradiction in the form of moral law? The man of duty invents a 'law' of repetition; he decides what in principle could be repeated. He thought he had thereby defeated both the demonic and the wantonness. Moreover, as an echo of Dostoev's concerns or a response to them, is there not a modicum in that repetition apparatus described with such precision by Kierkegaard's biographers, right down to the amazing games that he made for himself, and the regularity of his daily promenade (or the case that neglecting one's toilet and missing exercise are among those conducts whose success cannot, without contradiction, be regarded as a universal law, nor, therefore, be the object of rightful repetition)?

Conscience, however, suffers from the following ambiguity: it can be concerned only by supposing the moral law to be external, superior and indifferent to the natural law; but the application of the moral law can be conceived only by referring to conscience itself the image and the model of the law of nature. As a result, the moral law, far from giving us true repetition, still leaves us in generality. This time, the generality is not that of nature but that of habit as a second nature. It is useless to point to the existence of (innocent or bad) habits: it is the form of habit - or, as Bergson used to say, the habit of acquiring habits (the whole of obligation) - which is essentially moral or has the form of the good. Furthermore, in this whole of generality of habit we again find the two major orders: that of transience, in the variable conformity of the elements of action with a given model in so far as the habit has not been acquired, and that of

Handwritten notes in the left margin, including the name 'Kierkegaard' and other illegible text.

equivalence, with the equality of the stimulus of action in different situations once the habit has been acquired. As a result, habit never gives rise to true repetition: sometimes the action changes and is perfectible while the stimulus remains constant, sometimes the action remains the same in different contexts and with different intentions. There again, if repetition is possible, it would appear only between or beneath the two generalities of perfection and integration, resulting to the presence of a quite different power, at the risk of overturning these two generalities.

If repetition is possible, it is as much opposed to moral law as it is to natural law. There are two known ways to overturn moral law. One is by ascending towards the principles, challenging the law as secondary, derived, borrowed or 'general' by denouncing it as involving a second-hand principle which diverts an original force or usurps an original power. The other way, by contrast, is to overturn the law by descending towards the consequences, to which one submits with a too-perfect attention to detail. By adopting the law, a falsely submissive soul manages to evade it and to taste pleasures it was supposed to forbid. We can see this in demagogues by absurdity and working to rule, but also in some forms of masochistic behaviour which mock by sublimation. The first way of overturning the law is ironic, where irony appears as an act of principles, of ascent towards the principles and of overturning principles. The second is humorous, which is an act of consequences and descents, of submission and falls. Must we understand that repetition appears in both this surprise and this victim, as though existence reconquered and 'returned' itself once it is no longer constrained by laws? Repetition belongs to humour and irony: it is by nature transgressive or excessive, always repeating a stimulus opposed to the particular subsumed under laws, a universal opposed to the generalities which give rise to laws.

There is a basic common to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, (Figgis would have to be added in order to form the triptych of protest, Anarchism and Catholicism). Each of the three, in his own way, makes repetition not only a given peculiar to language and thought, a specific ethos and pathology, but also the fundamental category of a philosophy of the future. To each corresponds a Testament as well as a Theatre, a conception of the theatre, and a form of repetition as a principal character in that theatre: Job-Abraham, Don Juan-Zarathustra, Joan of Arc-Christ. What separates them is considerable, evident and well-known. But nothing can hide this prodigious coincidence in relation to a philosophy of repetition: they capture repetition in all forms of generality. Nor do they take the word 'repetition' as a metaphorical ornament on the contrary, they have a way of taking it literally and of introducing it into their style. We can - or rather, must - list of all for the principal propositions which indicate the points on which they coincide:

Handwritten notes at the bottom of the page, including the name 'Kierkegaard' and other illegible text.

Difference and Repetition

1. Make something new of repetition itself: connect it with a new, with a selection or selective act; make it the supreme object of the will and of freedom. Kierkegaard specifies that it is not a matter of drawing something new from repetition; of retaining something new from it. Only contemplation of the mind which contemplates from without 'extracts'. It is rather a matter of acting, of making repetition as such a novelty; that is, a freedom and a task of freedom. In the case of Nietzsche: liberate the will from everything which hinders it by making repetition the very object of willing. No doubt it is repetition which already hinders but if we do of repetition we are also willed and hailed by it - hailed, above all, by the other repetition. The whole mystical game of love and salvation is therefore contained in repetition, along with the whole theatrical game of life and death and the whole positive game of illness and health (cf. Zarathustra II and Zarathustra's conversations by virtue of one and the same power which is that of repetition in the eternal return).

2. In consequence, oppose repetition to the laws of nature, Kierkegaard declares that he does not speak at all of repetition in nature, of cycles and seasons, exchanges and equalities. Furthermore, if repetition concerns the most intrinsic essence of the will, this is because everything changes around the will, in accordance with the law of nature. According to the law of nature, repetition is impossible. For this reason, Kierkegaard condemns as anathema repetition every attempt to obtain repetition from the laws of nature by identifying with the legislative principle, whether in the Epicurean or the Stoic manner. It will be said that the situation is not so clear with Nietzsche. Nietzsche's declarations are nevertheless explicit. If he discovers repetition in the *Physis* itself, this is because he discovers in the *Physis* something superior to the reign of laws: a will willing itself through all change, a power opposed to laws, an interior of the earth opposed to the laws of its surface. Nietzsche opposes his hypothesis to the cyclical hypothesis. He conceives of repetition in the eternal return as being, but he opposes this being to every legal form, to the being regular as much as to the being equal. How could the thinker who goes further in criticizing the notion of law reintroduce eternal return as a law of nature? How could such a cosmologist of the Greeks be justified in regarding his own thought as prodigious and new, if he were content to formalize that natural principle, that generality regarding nature well known to the Ancients? On two occasions, Zarathustra corrects numerous interpretations of the eternal return, with anger, directed at his dream ('Spirit of Gravity ... do not treat this too lightly'), with kindness, directed at his animals ('O buffoons and faint-organs ... you have already made a return out of it'). The return is the eternal return as cycle or circulation, as being similar and being equal - in short, as natural animal certitude and as sensible law of nature.

3. Oppose repetition to moral law, in the point where it becomes the suggestion of ethics, a thought learned good and evil. Repetition opposes

Differenz und Wiederholung, 1977, S. 117-118. (10) Nietzsche, Werke, Bd. 10, KSA 11, 117-118. Nietzsche, Werke, Bd. 10, KSA 11, 117-118. Nietzsche, Werke, Bd. 10, KSA 11, 117-118.

Repetition and Difference

as the logos of the ordinary and the singular; the logos of the 'private thinker'. Both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche develop the repetition between the private thinker, the thinker-come and bearer of repetition, and the public professor and doctor of law, whose second-hand discourses proceed by reduction and lack its meaning source in the generality of concepts (cf. Kierkegaard against Hegel, Nietzsche against Kant and Hegel) and from this point of view, Pegey against the Sorbonnes. Job is infinite constancy and Abraham infinite singularity, but these are one and the same thing. Job challenges the law in an ironic manner, retaining all second-hand explanations and dissolving the general in order to reach the most singular as principle or as universal. Abraham submits humbly to the law, but finds in that submission precisely the singularity of his only son whom the law commanded him to sacrifice. As Kierkegaard understands it, repetition is the transcendence contained shared by the psychical invention of commitment and resignation. (We rediscover the two aspects in Pegey's doubling of Joan of Arc and Gertrude.) In Nietzsche's striking aphorism, hatred of the law and amor fati (love of fate), aggression and acquiescence are the two facts of Zarathustra, gathered from the Bible and turned back against it. Further, in a certain sense one can see Zarathustra's moral trait of repetition as competing with Kant. The eternal return says: whatever you will, will it in such a manner that you also will its eternal return. There is a 'imitation' here which overturns Kant on his own ground, a act which goes further even, instead of relating repetition to a supposed moral law, it serves to make repetition itself the only form of a law beyond morality. In reality, however, things are even more complicated. The form of repetition in the eternal return is the fused form of the particular, that of the universal and the singular retained, which detaches every general law, dissolves the mediations and annihilates the particular subjected to the law. Just as white and black become one in Zarathustra, so there is a within-the-law and a beyond-the-law united in the eternal return.

4. Oppose repetition not only to the generalization of habit but also to the particularization of memory. For it is perhaps habit which manages to 'draw' something new from a repetition contemplated from within. With habit, we are still on the condition that there is a little self within us which contemplates it in this which retains the new - in other words, the general - how the pseudo-repetition of particular cases. Memory, then, perhaps reverses the particular dissolved in generality. These psychological movements are of little consequence for both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard they talk away on the face of repetition proposed in the double combination of habit and memory. In this way, repetition is the thought of the future: it is opposed to both the modern category of retrospection and the modern category of habitus. It is in repetition and by repetition that forgetting becomes a positive power while the unconscious becomes a

Repetition and difference are the same thing, just as the difference between the two is the same as the difference between the two. Repetition is not a simple repetition, it is a repetition of the difference between the two.

A new habit is a new habit, but it is not a new habit. A new habit is a new habit, but it is not a new habit. A new habit is a new habit, but it is not a new habit.

power and repeat themselves (for example, beginning as a force is an integral part of the level repetition of eternal return). *Essentially it remains up to power.* When Kierkegaard speaks of repetition as the second power of association, "second" means not a second time but the nature which belongs to a single time, the nature which belongs to an instant, the association which belongs to *immediacy*, the *only* power. And when Nietzsche presents the eternal return as the immediate repetition of the will by power, will in power does not at all mean 'to want power' but, on the contrary, whatever you will, carry it to the 'only' power — in other words, separate out the superior form by virtue of the selective operation of thought in the eternal return, by virtue of the singularity of repetition in the eternal return itself. Here, in the superior form of everything that is, we find the immediate identity of the eternal return and the Overman.⁴

We are not suggesting any resemblance whatsoever between Nietzsche's Dionysus and Kierkegaard's God. On the contrary, we believe that the difference is insurmountable. But this is all the more reason to ask why these considerations concerning the fundamental objective, the theme of repetition, even though they sidetrack this objective (ultimately) Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are among those who bring to philosophy new means of expression: in relation to them we speak really of an overcoming of philosophy. Furthermore, in all their work, movement is at issue. Their objection to Hegel is that he does not go beyond false movement — in other words, the abstract logical movement of 'essentials'. They want to put metaphysics in motion, in action. They want to make it act, and make it carry out immediate acts. It is not enough, therefore, for them to propose a new representation of movement; representation is already finished. Rather, it is a question of producing within the work a movement capable of affecting the mind outside of all representation; it is a question of making movement itself a work, without incorporation of representing, direct signs for motion, representation, of insistent efficacies, concerns, whirlings, gravitations, dances or leaps which directly touch the mind. This is the idea of a man of the theatre, the idea of a director before his text. In this sense, something completely new begins with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. They no longer reflect on the theatre — the Hegelian manner. Neither do they set up a philosophical theatre. They invent an insoluble equation of drama within philosophy, thereby founding simultaneously the theatre of the future and a new philosophy. It will be said that, at least from the point of view of theatre, there was no production (within the profession of poets and Copenhagen around 1840, not the break with Wagner and Schopenhauer, was a favourable condition. One thing, however, is certain: when Kierkegaard speaks of ancient theatre and modern drama, the environment has already changed; we are no longer in the situation of reflection. We find here a thinker who lives the problem of masks, who experiences the most exigent of masks and seeks to fill it, to

complete it, albeit with the 'absolutely different' — that is, by putting into it all the difference between the finite and the infinite, thereby creating the idea of a theatre of humour and of faith. When Kierkegaard explains that the Knight of Faith resembles a bourgeois in his Sunday best as he is capable of being mistaken for one, this philosophical instruction must be taken in the context of a director showing how the Knight of Faith should be played. And when he comments on Job or Abraham, when he imagines the variations of Agnes and the Tatar, he rewrites the tale in a manner which is clearly that of a musician. Musset's music resonates even in Abraham and Job: it is a matter of 'leaping' in the face of the music. 'I look only at moments' is the language of a director who poses the highest theatrical problem, the problem of a movement which would directly touch the soul, which would be that of the soul.⁵

... Even more so with Nietzsche. The birth of Tragedy is not a reference on nature theatre as much as the practical foundation of a theatre of the future, the opening up of a path along which Nietzsche will think it possible to push Wagner. The break with Wagner is not a matter of theory, not of music; it concerns the respective roles of text, history, voice, music, light, song, dance and décor in this theatre of which Nietzsche dreams. Zarathustra incorporates the two attempts — *Lehrjahre* (Friedrich Schlegel), *Manuscript*, if there is better than Wagner, it is from the point of view of theatre and for Zarathustra's dance. Nietzsche's approach to Wagner is that he invented and discovered 'moments', giving us a musical theatre in which we must paddle and swim rather than one in which we can walk and dance. Zarathustra is conceived entirely within philosophy, but also entirely for the stage. Everything as it is posed and visualised, put in motion and made to walk or dance. How can it be read without watching for the exact sound of the creak of the higher man, how can the prologue be read without seeing the episode of the tightrope walker which opens the whole story? At certain moments, it is a comic opera about visible things and it is not by chance that Nietzsche speaks of the comic characters of the Overman. Remember the song of Astarte from the mouth of the old Socrates; here, two masks are superimposed — that of a young woman, almost of a Kari, which has just been laid over the mask of a peopled old man. The actor must play the role of an old man playing the role of the Kari. Here too, for Nietzsche, it is a matter of filling the inner emptiness of the mask within a theatrical space: by multiplying the superimposed masks and increasing the complexity of Dionysus in that superimposition, by uniting both the intensity of real movement and the form of the absolute difference given in the repetition of eternal return. When Nietzsche says that the Overman resembles Borgia rather than Parsifal, or when he suggests that the Overman belongs as much to both the Jesuit Order and the Prussian officer corps, we can understand these texts only by taking them

for what they are the remains of a drama indicating how the Overman should be 'played'.

Theatre is real movement, and it retains real movement from all the arts it employs. This is what we are told: the movement, the essence and the universality of movement is not opposition, not mediation, not repetition. Hegel is dismissed as the man who proposes an abstract movement of concepts instead of a movement of the *Physis* and the *Psyche*. Hegel abstracts the abstract relation of the particular to the concept in general for the true relation of the singular and the universal in the Idea. He does retain in the reflected elements of 'representations', within simple generality. He represents concepts instead of dramatizing Ideas: he creates a false theatre, a false drama, a false movement. We must ask how Hegel betrays and distorts the immediate in order to ground his dialectic in that incomprehension, and to introduce mediation in a movement which is no more than that of his own thought and its generalities. When we say, on the contrary, that movement is repetition and that this is our true theatre, we are not speaking of the effort of the actor who 'repeats' because he has not yet learned the part. We have in mind the theatrical space, the emptiness of that space, and the manner in which it is filled and determined by the signs and masks through which the actor plays a role which plays other roles; we think of how repetition is woven from one distinctive point to another, including the differences within itself. (When Marx also criticises the abstract Idea movement or mediation of the Hegelians, he finds himself drawn to an idea, which he indicates rather than develops, an essentially 'theatrical' idea: is the error that history is theatre, then repetition, along with the tragic and the comic which repetition forms a condition of movement under which the 'actor' or the 'viewer' produce something objectively new in history.) The theatre of repetition is opposed to the theatre of representation, just as movement is opposed to the concept and to representation which relate it back to the concept. In the theatre of repetition, we experience just forces, dynamic lines in space which act without intermediary upon the spirit, and link it directly with nature and history, with a language which speaks before words, with gestures which develop before organized bodies, with masks before faces, with spectres and phantasms before characters - the whole apparatus of repetition as a 'terrible power'.

It then becomes easy to speak of the differences between Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Even this question, however, must no longer be posed at the speculative level of the abstract essence of the God of Abraham or the Dionysus of Zarathustra. It is rather a matter of knowing what it means to 'produce movement', to repeat or to obstruct repetition. Is it a matter of leaping, as Kierkegaard believed? Or is it rather a matter of dancing, as Nietzsche thinks? He does not like the combination of dancing and leaping only Zarathustra's ape, his *Donna*, his *Donat*, his halloo, leap).

The theatre of repetition is opposed to the theatre of representation, just as movement is opposed to the concept and to representation which relate it back to the concept.

Kierkegaard offers us a theatre of faith, he opposes spiritual movement, the movement of faith, to logical movement. He can thus insist as to go beyond all aesthetic repetition, beyond irony and even humour, all the while partially aware that he offers us only the aesthetic, ironic and humorous image of such a going-beyond. With Nietzsche, it is a theatre of nihilism, of movement as *Physis*, already a theatre of cruelty. Here, humour and irony are indispensable and fundamental operations of nature. And what would eternal return be, if we forget that it is a vertiginous movement endowed with a force not one which causes the return of the same in general, but one which selects, one which repeats as well as creates, destroys as well as produces? Nietzsche's leading idea is to ground the repetition in eternal return on both the death of God and the dissolution of the self. However, it is a quite different alliance in the theatre of faith Kierkegaard dreams of an alliance between a God and a self rediscovered. All sorts of differences follow: is the movement in the sphere of the world, or is the excess of the earth which knows neither God nor self? What will it be later provoked against generalities, against mediation? Is repetition supernatural, or the extent that it is over and above the laws of nature? Or is it rather the most natural will of Nature in itself and willing itself as *Physis*, because Nature is by itself superior to its own kingdoms and its own laws? Has Kierkegaard not mixed all kinds of things together in his condemnation of 'aesthetic' repetition: a pseudo-repetition attributable to general laws of nature and a true repetition in nature itself; a pathological repetition of the passions and a repetition in art and the work of art? We cannot now resolve any of these problems; it has been enough for us to find theoretical confirmations of an irreducible difference between generality and repetition.

Repetition and generality are opposed from the point of view of conduct and from the point of view of law. It remains to specify a third opposition from the point of view of concepts or representation. Let us pose a question and seek a concept more by in principle the concept of a particular existing thing, that having an infinite comprehension. Infinite comprehension is the correlate of an exteriority = I. It is very important that this infinity of comprehension be supposed actual, not virtual or simply potential: it is on this condition that predicates on the basis of movement of concepts are perceived, and have an effect on the subject to which they are attributed. Infinite comprehension that makes possible remembering and recognition, memory and self-consciousness (even when these two faculties do not themselves infinite). The relation of a concept to its object under this double aspect, in the form that it summons in the memory and this self-consciousness, is called representation. From this may be drawn the principle of a negated Leibnizianism. According to a principle of difference,

The theatre of repetition is opposed to the theatre of representation, just as movement is opposed to the concept and to representation which relate it back to the concept.

every determination is conceptual in the last instance, or actually belongs to the comprehensiveness of a concept. According to a principle of sufficient reason, there is always one concept per particular thing. According to the religious principle of the identity of indiscernibles, there is one and only one thing per concept. Together, these principles exposed a theory of difference as conceptual difference, or develop the account of representation as mediation.

However, a concept can always be blocked at the level of such of its determinations or such of the positions that it includes. In so far as it serves as a determination, a predicate must remain fixed in the concept while becoming something else in the thing (animal becomes something other in man and in horse; humanity something other in Peter and in Paul). This is why the comprehensiveness of the concept is infinite: having become other in the thing, the predicate is like the object of another predicate in the concept. For this is also why each determination remains general or defines a resemblance, or the extent that it contains fixed in the concept and applicable by right to an infinity of things. Here, the concept is then constituted in such a fashion that, in its real use, its comprehensiveness extends to infinity, but in its logical use, this comprehensiveness is always liable to an artificial blockage. Every logical division of the comprehensiveness of a concept reduces it with an extension greater than 1, in principle infinite, and that of a generality such that no existing individual can correspond to it but in some rule of the inverse relation of comprehensiveness and extension. Thus, the principle of difference understood as difference in the concept does not oppose, but, on the contrary, allows the greatest space possible for the apprehension of resemblances. Thus from the point of view of comprehensiveness, the question 'What difference is there?' may always be transformed into: 'What resemblance is there?' But above all, in classification, the determination of species implies and supposes a common evaluation of resemblance. Individually, resemblance is not a partial identity, but that is only because the predicate in the concept is not, by virtue of its becoming other in the thing, a part of that thing.

We wish to indicate the difference between this type of artificial blockage and a quite different type which must be called a natural blockage of the concept. One refers to logic pure and simple, but the other refers to a transcendental logic or a dialectic of existence. Let us suppose that a concept, taken at a particular moment when its comprehensiveness is finite, is forcibly assigned a place in space and time - that is, an extension corresponding normally to the extension = 1. We would say, then, that a genus or species passes into extension n : at once without any augmentation of comprehensiveness. There is a cut between that extension = 1 imposed upon the concept and the extension = n : that is, such comprehensiveness demands in principle. The result will be a 'discrete extension' - that is, a partitioning of individuals absolutely identical in

Individuals are not identical in themselves, but only in their extension.

respect of their concept, and participating in the same singularity in existence (the paradox of doubles or twins). The phenomenon of discrete extension implies a natural blockage of the concept, different in kind from a logical blockage: it forms a true repetition in existence rather than an order of resemblance in thought. There is a significant difference between generality, which always designates a logical power of concepts, and repetition, which signifies in their powerlessness or their real limits. Repetition is the pure fact of a concept with being comprehensiveness being forced to pass in each case into extension: can we find examples of such a passage? Epicurean atoms would be one: individually localized in space, they nevertheless have a single comprehensiveness, which is made up for in discrete extension, to the point where there exists an infinity of atoms of the same shape and size. The existence of Epicurean atoms may be doubted. On the other hand, the existence of words, which are in a strict logical sense, cannot be doubted. Words possess a comprehensiveness which is necessarily finite, since they are by nature the objects of a merely nominal definition. We have here a reason why the comprehensiveness of the concept cannot extend to infinity: we define a word by only a finite number of words. Nevertheless, speech and writing, from which words are inseparable, give them an existence far at once: a genus thereby passes into existence as such; and here again extension is made up for in dispersion, or discontinuity, under the sign of a repetition which forms the real power of language in speech and writing.

The question is: are there other natural blockages besides those of discrete extension and finite comprehensiveness? Let us assume a concept with infinite comprehensiveness (virtually infinite). However far one pursues that comprehensiveness, one can always think that it subsumes perfectly identical objects. By contrast with the actual infinite, where the concept is sufficient by right to distinguish its object from every other object, in this case the concept can persist in comprehensiveness indefinitely, always subsuming a plurality of objects which is itself indefinite. Here again, the concept is the same - indefinitely the same - for objects which are distinct. We must therefore recognize the existence of non-conceptual differences between these objects. It is Kant who best indicates the correlation between objects endowed with only an indefinite specification, and purely spatial-temporal or oppositional, non-conceptual determinations (the paradox of erroneous objects). However, these determinations are precisely only the figures of repetition: space and time are themselves repetitive milieux, and real opposition is not a maximum of difference but a maximum of repetition - a repetition induced in two, echoing and returning on itself; a repetition which has found the means to define itself. Repetition thus appears as difference without a concept, repetition which creates differently constituted conceptual definitions. It expresses a power proper to the existent, a subdetermining of the existent in variation, which means

Individuals are not identical in themselves, but only in their extension.

every application by concepts of matter how far they extend. However far you go in the concept, Kant says, you can always repeat - that is, make several objects correspond to it, or at least two, one for the left and one for the right, one for the more and one for the less, one for the positive and one for the negative.

Such a notion may be better understood if we consider that concepts with indefinite comprehensions are concepts of Nature. As such, they are always in something else: they act not in Nature but in the mind which contemplates it or observes it, and represents it to itself. That is why it is said that Nature is abstracted mind or abstracted concept, opposed to itself. Corresponding to such concepts are those objects which themselves lack memory - that is, which neither present nor collect in themselves their own moments. The question is asked why Nature repeats because it is *pariter et in parte, mens inmensitatis*. Now by this phrase to the mind which represents itself because the mind has a memory or acquires habits, it is capable of forming concepts in general and of drawing something new, of abstracting something new from the repetition that it contemplates.

Concepts with finite comprehensions are nominal concepts: concepts with indefinite comprehensions but without memory are concepts of Nature. Yet these two cases still do not exhaust the examples of natural blockage. Take an individual man as a particular representation with infinite comprehensions, endowed with memory but lacking self-consciousness. The comprehensive representation is indeed in itself, the memory is there, embracing all the particularity of an act, a scene, an event in a being. What is missing, however, for a determinate natural reason, is the *in-itself* of consciousness or recognition. What is missing in the memory is remembrance - or rather, the working through of memory. Consciousness establishes between the I and the representation a relation much more profound than that which appears in the expression 'I have a representation': it relates the representation to the I as if in a free faculty which does not allow itself to be confined within any one of its products, but for which each product is already thought and recognized as past, the occasion of a determinate change in inner meaning. When the consciousness of knowledge or the working through of memory is missing, the knowledge in itself is only the impression of its object: it is played, that is to say repeated, repeated instead of being known. Repetition here appears as the unconscious of the free concept, of knowledge or of memory, the unconscious of representation. It will be found to assign the natural reason for such a blockage: repetition or resistance, which makes repetition itself a veritable 'commence', a 'compulsion'. Here, then, is a third case of blockage, one which concerns, this time, the concept of freedom. Here too, from the standpoint of a certain Finalism, we can discover the principle of an inverse relation between repetition and consciousness, repetition and remembering, repetition and recognition (the paradox of the

Handwritten notes in the left margin of page 14, including phrases like 'The concept of matter is not a concept of nature' and 'The concept of nature is not a concept of matter'.

'miracle' or buried objects) the less one remembers, the less one is conscious of remembering one's past, the more one repeats it - remembers and works through the memory in order not to repeat it. Self-consciousness in recognition appears as the faculty of the future or the duration of the future, the function of the new. Is it not true that the only dead who occur are those whom one has buried too quickly and too deeply, without paying them the necessary respects, and that someone buried less to an extent of memory than to a powerlessness or to a failure in the working through of a memory?

There is a tragic and a comic repetition. Indeed, repetition always appears twice, once in the tragic destiny and once in the comic aspect. In the theatre, the hero repeats precisely because he is separated from an essential, infinite knowledge. This knowledge is in him, it is immersed in him and acts in him, but acts like something hidden, like a blocked representation. The difference between the comic and the tragic pertains to two elements: first, the nature of the repeated knowledge - in the one case immediate natural knowledge, a simple given of common sense, in the other terrible scientific knowledge, second, as a result, the manner in which the character is excluded from the knowledge, the manner in which 'he does not know that he knows'. In general the practical problem consists in this: this unknown knowledge must be represented as having the whole scene, aggregating all the elements of the play and compressing in itself all the points of mind and nature, but at the same time the hero cannot represent it to himself - on the contrary, he must enact it, play it and repeat it and the scene occurs that Aristotle called 'recognition'. At this point, repetition and representation confuse one another and merge, without, however, containing their two levels, the one reflecting itself in and being contained by the other, the knowledge as it is represented on stage and as repeated by the actor then being recognized as the same.

The destiny, the abstracted and the repeated are the three cases of natural blockage, corresponding respectively to nominal concepts, concepts of nature and concepts of freedom. In all these cases, however, conceptual identity or sameness of representation is invoked to account for repetition: repetition is attributed to elements which are really distinct but nevertheless share strictly the same concept. Repetition then appears as a difference, but a difference absolutely without concept in this sense, an indifferent difference. The words 'really', 'strictly', 'absolutely' are supposed to refer to the phenomenon of natural blockage, in opposition to logical blockage which only determines a generality. However, an important drawback compromises this whole endeavour. As long as we insist on obtaining conceptual identity for distinct objects, we suggest a purely negative explanation, an explanation by default. The fact that this default should be grounded in

Handwritten notes at the bottom of page 15, including the phrase 'The fact that this default should be grounded in'.

the nature of concepts or representations themselves changes nothing. In the first case, repetition occurs because natural concepts naturally possess a basic comprehension. In the second case, repetition occurs because concepts of nature are naturally devoid of essence, plural and outside themselves. In the third case, because the concept of freedom remains unconscious while essence and representations remain repressed. In all three cases, that which repeats does so only by dint of not comprehending, not representing, not knowing or not being conscious. Throughout, the ambiguity of concepts and of their representative components (memory and self-consciousness, remembrance and recognition) is captured in account for repetition. Such is therefore the default of every argument grounded in the form of identity in the concept: these arguments give us only a nominal definition and a negative explanation of repetition. No doubt the formal identity which corresponds to simple logical blockage may be opposed to real identity (the Law) as this appears in natural blockage. But natural blockage itself requires a positive supra-conceptual force capable of explaining it, and of thereby explaining repetition.

Let us return to the example of psychoanalysis: we repeat because we repress... Freud was never satisfied with such a negative schema, in which repetition is explained by essence. It is true that, from the beginning, repression was considered a positive power. However, he borrowed this positivity from the pleasure principle or from the reality principle: it was merely a derived positivity, one of opposition. The turning point of Freudianism appears in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*: the death instinct is discovered, not in connection with the destructive tendencies, not in connection with aggressivity, but as a fruit of a direct constitution of repetition phenomena. Strangely, the death instinct serves as a positive, negative principle for repetition: this is its domain and its meaning. It plays the role of a transcendental principle, whereas the pleasure principle is only psychological. For this reason, it is above all since (not given to experience), whereas the pleasure principle is noisy. The first question, then, is: How is it that the theme of death, which appears to draw together the most negative elements of psychological life, can be in itself the most positive element, transcendently positive, in the form of allowing repetition? How can it be raised to a principal subject? But a second question immediately arises: Under what form is repetition affirmed and prescribed by the death instinct? Ultimately, it is a question of the relation between repetition and disguise. Do the disguises found in the work of dreams or symptoms - condensations, displacements, dramatization - reduplicate while attenuating a base, from repetition (repetition of the same)? From the first theory of repression, Freud indicated another path: Dora elaborates her own role, and repeats her love for the father, only through other roles filled by others, which she herself adopts in relation to these others (K., Frau K., the governess...). The disguises and the

The text on the left page is a dense philosophical argument. It discusses the nature of concepts and representations, and how repetition occurs in different contexts. It mentions Freud's work and the concept of the death instinct. The text is written in a dense, academic style.

variations, the masks or costumes, do not come from above: they are, on the contrary, the essential genetic elements of repetition itself, its integral and constitutive parts. This part would have been able to lead the analysis of the unconscious towards a variable theme. However, if it did not do so, this was because Freud was unable to prevent himself maintaining the model of a latent repetition, at least as a tendency. We see this when he attributes fixation to the *id* despite its then understood from the perspective of a simple opposition of forces: disguised repetition is only the fruit of a secondary compromise between the opposed forces of the *Ego* and the *id*. Even beyond the pleasure principle, the form of a bare repetition persists, since Freud interprets the death instinct as a tendency in return to the state of inorganic matter, one which upholds the model of a wholly physical or material repetition.

Death has nothing to do with a material model. On the contrary, the death instinct may be understood in relation to masks and costumes. Repetition is truly that which disguises itself in constituting itself, that which constitutes itself only by disguising itself. It is not underneath the masks, but is formed from one mask to another, as though from one distinctive point to another, from one privileged instance to another, with and within the narcissism. The masks do not hide anything except other masks: there is no final term which is reached, and even our childhood love for the mother repeats other adult loves with regard to other women, rather like the way in which the hero of *In Search of Lost Time* replaces with his mother Swann's passion for Odette. There is therefore nothing repeated which may be isolated or abstracted from the repetition in which it was formed, but in which it is also hidden. There is no bare repetition which may be abstracted or inferred from the disguise itself. The same thing is both disguising and disguised. A decisive moment in psychoanalysis occurred when Freud gave up, in certain respects, the hypothesis of real childhood events, which would have played the part of ultimate disguised terms, in order to substitute the power of fantasy which is inscribed in the death instinct, where everything is already masked and disguised. In short, repetition is in its essence symbolic, symbolic or symbolic as the letter of repetition itself. Difference is included in repetition by way of disguise and by the order of the symbol. This is why the variations do not come from without, do not express a secondary compromise between a repressing instance and a repressed instance, and must not be understood on the basis of the still negative forms of symptoms, reversal or overcoming. The variations express, rather, the differential mechanism which belongs to the source and origin of that which is repeated. We should thus overturn the relations between covered and 'uncovered' within repetition. Take an uncovered of bare repetition: repetition of the same: such as an obstinational exercise or a schizophrenic stereotype: the mechanical element in the repetition, the

The text on the right page continues the philosophical argument. It discusses the relationship between repetition and disguise, and how repetition is formed from one mask to another. It mentions Freud's work and the concept of the death instinct. The text is written in a dense, academic style.

The text at the bottom of the right page is a dense philosophical argument. It discusses the relationship between repetition and disguise, and how repetition is formed from one mask to another. It mentions Freud's work and the concept of the death instinct. The text is written in a dense, academic style.

element of action apparently repeated, occurs as a series for a more profound experience, which is played in another dimension, a secret verticality in which the roles and masks are furnished by the death instinct. Theatre of horror, Rimbaud's said of schizophrenia: There, the 'never seen' is not the contrary of the 'already seen': both signify the same thing, and are lived each in the other. Neval's Sylvia already introduced us into this theatre; and the *Grandes*, so close to a Nietzschean inspiration, shows us the hero who lives at once both repetition as such and the repeated which is always *degraded* in the repetition. In the analysis of characters, the appearance of the theme of death coincides with the moment at which the character has command of all the characters of his dream and brings them together in a repetition of which the 'temporary' is only the external envelope. The mask, the costume, the covered is everywhere the truth of the uncovered. The mask is the true subject of repetition. Because repetition differs in kind from representation, the repeated cannot be represented: rather, it must always be repeated, masked by what signifies it, itself masking what it signifies.

I do not repeat because I repress. I repress because I repeat. I forget because I repeat. I repress, because I can live certain things or certain experiences only in the mode of repression. I am determined to repress whatever would prevent me from living them: thus, in particular, the representation which mediates the lived by relating it to the form of a similar or identical object. *Eros and Thanatos* in *Geistgeschiede* in that *Eros* must be repeated, can be lived only through repetition, whereas *Thanatos* in its transcendental principle is that which gives repetition to *Eros*, that which subverts *Eros* to repetition. Only such a point of view is capable of illumining us in the obscure problems of the origin of repression, its nature, its names and the exact sense in which it bears. For when Freud shows - beyond repression 'properly speaking', which bears upon representations - the necessity of supposing a primary repression which concerns first and foremost pure presentations, or the manner in which the drives are necessarily lived, we believe that he comes almost to a positive internal principle of repetition. This first appears to him determinable in the form of the death instinct, and it is this which, far from being explained by it, must explain the blockage of representation in repression properly speaking. This is why the law of an inverse relation between repetition and remembering is in every respect hardly satisfactory, in so far as it makes repetition depend upon repression.

Freud noted from the beginning that in order not stop repeating it was not enough to remember in the abstract (without affect), nor to form a concept in general, nor even to represent the repressed event in all its particularity: it was necessary to seek out the territory there where it was, to install oneself directly in the past in order to accomplish a living communion between the knowledge and the resistance, the representation

and the blockage. We are not, therefore, misled by simple statements, any more than we are made ill by answers. Here, as elsewhere, becoming conscious counts for little. The more theoretical and dramatic operation by which thinking takes place - or 'Does not take place' - has a more transference. Now transference is still repetition: above all it is repetition. It repeats, makes us ill, or else heals us: it sustains and destroys us, it also frees us, uniting in both cases to its 'divine' power. All that is a recourse to the bottom of repetition. There is indeed something analogous to scientific experimentation in transference, since the patient is supposed to repeat the whole of his disturbance in privileged, artificial conditions, taking the person of the analyst as 'object'. In transference, however, repetition does not so much serve to identify events, persons and passions as to authenticate the roles and select the masks. Transference is not an experiment but a principle which grounds the entire analytic experience. The roles themselves are by nature roots, but the verification of these roles appeals to the highest principle and the most profound judge, the death instinct. In effect, reflection on transference was a determinant motive behind the discovery of a 'beyond'. In this sense, repetition constitutes by itself the selective game of our illness and our health, of our loss and our salvation. How can this game be played in the death instinct? No doubt in a sense close to that in which Miller, in his wonderful book on Rimbaud, says: 'I realized that I was free; that the death I had gone through had charmed me.'²¹ It seems that the idea of a death instinct must be understood in terms of three paradoxical and complementary statements: to give repetition an original, positive principle, but also an unconscious dynamism power; and finally, to give it an incessant meaning in which sense is closely related with the statement of *idleness* and *action*.

Our problem concerns the essence of repetition. It is a question of knowing why repetition cannot be explained by the term of identity in concepts or representations: in what sense it demands a superior 'positive' principle. This enquiry must embrace all the concepts of nature and freedom: Goethe, not the border between these two cases, the repetition of a decorative motif: a figure is reproduced, while the concept remains absolutely identical.... However, this is not how artists proceed in reality. They do not juxtapose instances of the figure, but rather each time combine an element of one instance with another element of a following instance. They introduce a discontinuity into the dynamic process of construction, an instability, discontinuity or gap of some kind which disappears only in the overall effect. Concerning any such a case, Lévi-Strauss writes: 'These elements interlock with each other through dislocation, and it is only at the end that the pattern achieves a stability which both confirms and betrays the dynamic.'

repetition is not a simple repetition of the same, but a repetition of the different.

process according to which it has been carried out."¹¹ These remarks stand for the notion of causality in general. For it is not the elements of symmetry: *process* which matter for nature: is natural causality, but those which are moving and are not in the cause, what matters is the possibility of the cause having less symmetry than the effect. Moreover, causality would remain essentially conjectural, a simple logical causality, if that possibility were not at some moment or other effectively fulfilled. For this reason, the logical relation of causality is inseparable from a physical process of signalling, without which it would not be translated into action. By 'signal' we mean a system with orders of disparate size, resolved with elements of dissymmetry; by 'sign' we mean what happens within such a system, what flashes across the intervals when a communication takes place between disparate. The sign is indeed an effect, but an effect with two aspects: in one of these it expresses, *qua* sign, the productive dissymmetry; in the other it tends to cancel it. The sign is not entirely of the order of the symbol; nevertheless, it makes way for it by implying an internal difference (which leaving the conditions of its reproduction will external).

The negative expression 'lack of symmetry' should not mislead us: it indicates the origin and posteriority of the causal process. It is positivity itself. For us, as the example of the decorative motif suggests, it is essential to break down the notion of causality in order to distinguish two types of repetition: one which concerns only the overall, abstract effect, and the other which concerns the acting cause. One is a static repetition, the other is dynamic. One results from the work, but the other is like the 'evolution' of a bodily movement. One refers back to a single concept, which leaves only an external difference between the ordinary instances of a figure; the other is the repetition of an internal difference which it incorporates in each of its moments, and carries from one distinctive point to another. One could try to assimilate these two repetitions by saying that the difference between the first and the second is only a matter of a change in the content of the concept, or of the figure being articulated differently, but this would be to fail to recognize the respective order of each repetition. For in the dynamic order there is no representative concept, nor any figure represented in a pre-existing space. There is an *idea*, and a *pure* dynamism which creates a corresponding space.

Studies in rhythm or symmetry confirm this duality. A distinction is drawn between arithmetic symmetry, which refers back to a scale of whole or fractional coefficients, and geometric symmetry, based upon proportions or irrational ratios; a static symmetry which is cubic or hexagonal, and a dynamic symmetry which is pentagonal and appears in a spiral line or in a geometrically progressing pulsation — in short, in a living and mortal 'evolution'. Now, the second of these is at the heart of the first; it is the vital, positive, active procedure. In a network of double squares, we discover enclosing lines which have the curve of a pentagon or a

pentagon as their asymmetrical pole. The network is like a fabric stretched upon a framework, but the outline, the principal rhythm of that framework, is almost always a form independent of the network's such elements of dissymmetry: *idea* in both generic principle and principle of reflection for symmetrical figures.¹² The static repetition in the network of double squares thus refers back to a dynamic repetition, formed by a pentagon and 'the decreasing series of pentagrams which may be mentally inscribed therein'. Similarly, the study of rhythm allows us immediately to distinguish two kinds of repetition. Cadence-repetition is a regular division of time, an isochronous recurrence of identical elements. However, a period exists only in so far as it is determined by a tonic accent, commanded by intensities. Yet we would be mistaken about the function of accents if we said that they were reproduced at equal intervals. On the contrary, tonic and intensive values act by creating inequalities or incommensurabilities between metrically equivalent periods or spaces. They create *dissonance* points, privileged instants which always indicate a poly-rhythm. Here again, the unequal is the most positive element. Cadence is only the envelope of a rhythm, and of a relation between rhythms. The *repetition of points of inequality, of induction or of rhythmic events, is more profound than the reproduction of ordinary homogeneous elements. As a result, we should distinguish cadence-repetition and rhythm-repetition in every case, the first being only the outward appearance or the abstract effect of the second. A bare, material repetition (repetition of the Same) appears only in the sense that another repetition is signified within it, constituting it and communicating itself in departing itself. Even in nature, isochronous motions are only the outward appearance of a more profound movement, the involving cycles are only abstractions: placed together, they reveal evolutionary cycles or spirals whose principle is a variable curve, and the staccato of which has two dissymmetrical aspects, as though it had a right and a left. It is always in this gap, which should not be confused with the negative, that creatures wear their repetition and receive at the same time the gift of living and dying.*

Finally, to return to nominal concepts: is it the identity of the nominal concept which explains the repetition of a word? Take the example of rhyme: it is indeed verbal repetition, but repetition which includes the difference between two words and inscribes that difference at the heart of a poetic idea, in a space which is determined. Note does its meaning lie in marking equal intervals, but rather, as we see in a notion of strong rhyme, in putting equal values in the service of tonic rhythm, and contributing to the independence of tonic rhythm from arithmetic rhythm. As for the repetition of a single word, we must understand this as a 'protracted rhyme', not rhyme as a continued repetition. This generalization can proceed in two ways: either a word takes in two other words: a simultaneity or a paradoxical identity between the two others; or a word

taken in our sense exercises an attractive force on its neighbours, communicating an extraordinary gravity to them, until one of the neighbouring words takes up the burden and becomes in turn a centre of repetition. Raymond Roussel and Charles Peygy were the great repeaters of literature, able to fill the pathological power of language to a higher artistic level. Roussel takes ambiguous words or homonyms and fills the empty distance between their meanings with a story presumed twice and with others themselves doubled. He thinks, constructs heterogeneity on its own ground and inscribes the maximum difference within repetition, where this is the space opened up at the heart of a word. This space is well presented by Roussel as one of masks and death, in which is developed both a repetition which excludes and a repetition which saves - which saves above all from the one which excludes. Roussel creates an after-language where, once everything has been said, everything is repeated and reinscribed.¹⁷ Peygy's technique is very different: a thousand repetitions not for homogeneity but for heterogeneity; it concerns what linguists call the function of company rather than that of constancy; it forms a before-language, an actual language in which the step-by-step revision of an internal space within words proceeds by tiny differences. That time, everything leads to the problem of being and permanent death, but in relation to this problem also to the extraordinary choice to affirm a repetition which saves against that which repeats. Both Peygy and Roussel take language to one of its limits: in the case of Roussel, that of irregularity and repetition; the 'divinatory feature' between hillside and pillar in the case of Peygy, that of company or combination, the between signifier and signified. Both submit a vertical repetition of distinctive points, which takes us inside the words, for the horizontal repetition of ordinary words repeated. Both submit a positive repetition, one which flows from the excess of a language and rhythmic idea, for a repetition by default which results from the insufficiency of nominal concepts or verbal representations. How does death inspire language, given that it is always present when repetition is affirmed?

The reproduction of the form is not a matter of bodily movement. We know that even the simplest imitation involves a difference between inside and outside. Moreover, imitation plays only a secondary and regulatory role in the acquisition of a behaviour: it permits the correction of movements being made, but not their instigation. Learning takes place not in the relation between a representation and an action (reproduction of the form) but in the relation between a sign and a response (encounter with the Other). Signs involve heterogeneity in at least three ways: first, as the object which bears its own form, and is necessarily on a different level, as though there were two orders of size or disparate realities between which the sign fluctuates; secondly, as themselves, since a sign envelops another 'object' within the form of the object which bears it; and lastly, as a

Thought, representation can still be seen as a form, it is not the object's movement and representation which would be the form, but the sign, a difference between the two.

natural or spiritual power (as ideas) itself, as the response they elicit, since the movement of the response does not resemble that of the sign. The movement of the answer does not resemble that of the wave, in particular, the movement of the swimming instructor which we reproduce on the sand bears no relation to the movement of the wave, which we learn to deal with only by grasping the teacher in practice as sign. That is why it is so difficult to say how someone learns: there is an issue of acquired practical familiarity with signs, which means that there is something unknown - but also something fatal - about all education. We learn nothing from those who say 'Do as I do'. Our only teachers are those who tell us to 'Do with me', and are able to create signs to be developed in heterogeneity rather than propose gestures for us to reproduce. In other words, there is an auto-motivity, only messy-motivity. When a body confronts some of its own distinctive points with those of a wave, it exposes the principle of a repetition which is no longer that of the form, but involves the Other - manifest difference, force one wave and one gesture to another, and carries that difference through the repetitive space thereby constituted. To learn is indeed to constitute the space of an encounter with signs, in which the distinctive points reveal themselves in each other, and repetition takes shape while singulating itself. Apprenticeship always gives rise to images of death, at the edge of the space it creates and with the help of the heterogeneity it engenders. Signs are deadly when they are lost in the distance, but also when they strike us with full force. Oedipus receives a sign once from too far away, once from too close, and between the two a terrible repetition of the crime is woven. Zarathustra receives his 'sign' either from too near or from too far, and only at the end does he increase the correct distance which will turn that which is fatal remain makes him ill into a liberating and redemptive repetition. Signs are the true channels of thought. They testify to the spiritual and natural powers which act beneath the words, gestures, characters and objects represented. They signify repetition as one movement, an opposition to representation which is a false movement of the object.

We are right to speak of repetition when we find ourselves confronted by identical elements with exactly the same concept. However, we must distinguish between these discrete elements, these repeated objects, and a secret subject, the real subject of repetition, which repeats itself through them. Repetition must be understood in the personalist, we must feel the full of repetition, the singularity within that which repeats, for there is no repetition without a repeater, nothing repeated without a repetitive soul. As a result, rather than the repeated and the repeater, the object and the subject, we must distinguish two forms of repetition. In every case together is difference without a concept, but in one case, the difference is taken to be only external to the concept, it is a difference between objects

In each sense, the power to affirm either singularity or repetition, and we can only distinguish 'repetition' in both cases, it is the movement of the sign.

The difference between the two is that of the sign, which is the difference between the signifier and the signified, and the difference between the sign and the object.

represented by the same concept, falling into the indifference of space and time. In the other case, the difference is internal to the Idea, it unfolds as pure movement, creative of a dynamic space and time which correspond to the Idea. The first repetition is repetition of the Same, explained by the identity of the concept or representation; the second includes difference, and includes itself in the identity of the Idea, in the heterogeneity of an 'a-posteriori'. One is negative, occurring by default in the concept, the other affirmative, occurring by excess in the Idea. One is conjunctive, the other categorical. One is static, the other dynamic. One is repetition in the effect, the other in the cause. One is extensive, the other intensive. One is ordinary, the other distinctive and singular. One is horizontal, the other vertical. One is developed and explicit, the other enveloped and in need of interpretation. One is resolving, the other evoking. One involves equality, commensurability and symmetry; the other is grounded in inequality, incommensurability and dissymmetry. One is material, the other spiritual, even in nature and in the earth. One is horizontal, the other carries the secret of our death and our love, of our mechanism and our liberation, the dynamic, and the desire. One is a 'bare' repetition, the other a covered repetition, which forms itself in covering itself, in making and dissolving itself. One concerns accuracy, the other has authenticity as its criterion.

The two repetitions are not independent. One is the singular subject, the memory and the heart of the other, the Agent of the other. The other is only the external envelope, the abstract effect. The repetition of dissymmetry is hidden within symmetrical reversibility or effects; a repetition of distinctive power underpins that of ordinary power, and everywhere the Other is the repetition of the Same. This is the secret, the most profound repetition: it alone provides the principle of the otherness, the reason for the blockage of concepts. In this domain, as in Søren Kierkegaard, it is the masked, the disguised or the concealed which turns out to be the truth of the uncovered. Necessarily, since this repetition is not hidden by something else but forms itself by disguising itself, it does not pre-exist its own disguise and, in forming itself, constitutes the bare repetition within which it becomes revealed. Important consequences follow from this. When we are confronted by a repetition which proceeds masked, or conceals displacements, packings, shadings, varieties or differences which are ultimately capable of leading us far away from the point of departure, we tend to see a mixed state in which repetition is not pure but only approximate: the very word repetition seems to be employed symbolically, by analogy or metaphor. It is true that we have merely defined repetition as difference without concept. However, we would be wrong to reduce it to a difference which falls back into exteriority, because the concept embodies the form of the Same; without seeing that it can be internal to the Idea and possess in itself all the resources of signs, symbols

This is the very heart of the matter. The repetition of the Same is not a simple repetition of the Same, but a repetition of the Same which is always already different. The repetition of the Other is not a simple repetition of the Other, but a repetition of the Other which is always already the Same. The repetition of the Same is always already the Other, and the repetition of the Other is always already the Same. The repetition of the Same is always already the Other, and the repetition of the Other is always already the Same.

and identity which go beyond the concept as such. The examples invoked above concern the most diverse kinds of sign, from animal concepts to concepts of nature and mythos, and we could be charged with having mixed up all kinds of physical and psychical repetitions, even with having run together unecological repetitions and letters, symbolic repetitions in the psychical domain. However, we wished to show the coexistence of these instances in every repetitive structure, to show how repetitions display identical elements which necessarily refer back to a latent subject which repeats itself through these elements, forming an 'object' repetition at the heart of the firm. We therefore suggest that this entire repetition is in no way approximate or metaphorical. It is, on the contrary, the apex of every repetition. It is the very limit of every repetition, its watermark or constitutive cipher. It shows the surface of that in which every repetition contains difference without a concept, non-mediated difference. It is both the lateral and spiritual primary sense of repetition. The material sense results from this other, as if inscribed by it like a shell.

We began by distinguishing generality and repetition. Then we distinguished two forms of repetition. These two distinctions are linked: the consequences of the first are unfolded only in the second. For if we were content to treat repetition abstractly and as devoid of any meaning, we would remain incapable of understanding why and how a concept could be essentially blocked, allowing a repetition which has nothing to do with generality to appear. Conversely, when we discover the lateral meaning of repetition, we have the means not only to understand the cover repetition as a proof, but also to retrace the order of generality (and, following Kierkegaard's wish, to carry out the reconciliation of the singular with the general). For to the extent that the internal repetition projects itself through a bare repetition which covers it, the difference that it includes appears to be an entire surface which opposes repetition, which amasses it and vary it according to 'general' laws beneath the general operation of laws, however, there always remains the play of singularities. Cyclical generalities in nature are the masks of a singularity which appears through their interferences; and beneath the generalities of laws in moral life we rediscover singular processes of learning. The domain of laws must be understood, but always on the basis of a Nature and a Spirit superior to their own laws, which weave their repetitions in the depths of the earth and of the heart, where laws do not yet exist. The instance of repetition is always affected by an order of difference: it is only to the extent that something is linked to a repetition of an order other than its own that the repetition appears rational and bare, and the thing itself subject to the singularity of generality. It is the indissoluble between difference and repetition which gives rise to the idea of generality. Gabriel Tarde suggested in this sense that resemblance itself was only displaced repetition: real repetition is that which corresponds directly to a difference of the same

This is the very heart of the matter. The repetition of the Same is not a simple repetition of the Same, but a repetition of the Same which is always already different. The repetition of the Other is not a simple repetition of the Other, but a repetition of the Other which is always already the Same. The repetition of the Same is always already the Other, and the repetition of the Other is always already the Same. The repetition of the Same is always already the Other, and the repetition of the Other is always already the Same.

degree as itself. Better than anyone, Leibniz was able to elaborate a new doctrine by discovering in mind and nature the secret office to establish an ever more perfect correspondence between difference and repetition.¹³

So long as we take difference to be conceptual difference, essentially conceptual, and repetition to be an extrinsic difference between objects represented by the same concept, it appears that the problem of their relation may be resolved by the facts. Are there repetitions — yes or no? Or is every difference indeed intrinsic and conceptual in the last instance? Hegel ridiculed Leibniz for having invited the court ladies to undertake experimental metaphysics while walking in the garden, to see whether two leaves of a tree could not have the same concept. Replace the court ladies by formal scientists: no two grains of dust are absolutely identical, no two hands have the same distinctive pattern, no two repetitions have the same strike, no two revolutions occur three helms in the same manner. . . . Why, however, do we feel that the problem is not properly defined so long as we look for the existence of a conceptual individuation in the facts? It is because a difference can be internal, yet not conceptual (as the paradox of geometrical objects shows). A dynamic space must be defined from the point of view of an observer tied to that space, not from an external position. There are internal differences which determine an idea before representing an object. Difference here is internal to an idea, even though it be external to the concept which represents an object. That is why the opposition between Kant and Leibniz seems much less acute to the extent that one takes account of the dynamic feature present in the two decisions: if, in the form of intuition, Kant recognized extrinsic differences not reducible to the order of concepts, these are no less 'internal' even though they cannot be regarded as 'intrinsic' by the understanding, and can be represented only in their external relation to space as a whole.¹⁴ In other words, following certain neo-Kantian assumptions, there is a step-by-step, internal, dynamic construction of space which must precede the 'representation' of the whole as a form of exteriority. The elements of that internal process seem to us to consist of intensive quantity rather than schema, and to be related to ideas rather than to concepts of the understanding. If the spatial order of extrinsic differences and the conceptual order of intrinsic differences are finally in harmony, as the schema shows they are, this is ultimately due to this intensive differential element, the synthesis of continuity as a given moment which, in the form of a continuous repetition, first gives rise internally to the space corresponding to ideas. With Leibniz, the affinity between extrinsic differences and intrinsic conceptual differences already appealed to the internal process of a continuous repetition, provided upon an intensive differential element which ensures the synthesis of continuity at a point in order to regulate space-time within.

There are repetitions which are not only extrinsic differences, just as there are internal differences which are neither intrinsic nor conceptual. We are that in a better position to identify the source of the preceding ambiguity. When we define repetition as difference without concept, we are drawn to conclude that only extrinsic difference is involved in repetition; we consider, therefore, that any internal 'novelty' is sufficient to remove us from repetition proper and can be recorded only with an approximate repetition, so-called by analogy. Nothing of the sort is true. For we do not yet know what is the essence of repetition, what is positively denoted by the expression 'difference without concept', or the nature of the moment(s) it may imply. Conversely, when we define difference as conceptual difference, we believe we have done enough to specify the concept of difference as such. Nevertheless, here again we have no idea of difference, no concept of difference as such. Perhaps the mistake of the philosophy of difference, from Aristotle to Hegel via Leibniz, lay in confining the concept of difference with a merely conceptual difference, in refusing consent to inscribe difference in the concept in general. In reality, so long as we inscribe difference in the concept in general we have no singular idea of difference, we remain only with a difference already mediated by representation. We therefore find ourselves confronted by two questions: what is the concept of difference — one which is not reducible to simple conceptual difference but demands its own idea, its own singularity at the level of ideas? On the other hand, what is the essence of repetition — one which is not reducible to difference without concept, and cannot be confused with the apparent character of objects represented by the same concept, but bears witness to repetition as a power of ideas? The meeting between these two concepts, difference and repetition, can no longer be summed if they come about as a result of interferences and intercessions between their two lines: one concerning the essence of repetition, the other the idea of difference.

una forma del movimento per cui l'eterogeneo diventa
del uguale e del finito. Il movimento reale comincia per
un'altra forma di uguale. E' una ripetizione —
qualcosa per se stesso. La ripetizione non puo
ripetere di se stessa.

Non c'è una sola volta per cui. Finisce per se
ripetere. . . .

ESTETİĞİN FARK VE FARKLILIKLARA DAYALILIĞI ÜZERİNE ÜÇ DEĞERLENDİRME: SANAT VE GÜNCELE DAİR

José Luis Barrios

Sonuç olarak, fark dönüşlü olmaktan çıkar ve etkin olarak gerçek olan bir kavramı sadece felaketler kurgulayabildiği ölçüde geri kazanır: ya bir dizi benzerlik arasında süreklilik kesintileri ya da analogik yapılar arasında aşılabilir yarıklar ile. Dönüşlü olmaktan sadece felaket olabilmek için çıkar. Şüphesiz, biri olmadan diğeri de olamaz. Ama felaket olarak fark, görünür bir denge veya organik temsiliyet altında hareket etmeye devam eden indirgenemez bir zemine tanıklık etmekte değil midir?

Gilles Deleuze, Fark ve Tekrar, s. 35.

Hazırlık

ABD'deki 2008 ekonomik krizi ve yakın zamanlardaki Avrupa Birliği ütopyasının gelişme vaadindeki yokuş aşağı düşüş sonrasında dünyanın gelişmiş ekonomiler ve gelişmekte olan ekonomiler diye bölündüğünü düşünmek safıktır; aynı şekilde küresel toplumlar ve ekonomiler yönündeki hevesli değerlendirmeler de, gelecekte bireyler ve toplumlar olarak varoluş olasılığını ütopya ve gelişme ufkuna yerleştirmek de safık olacaktır. Belki de “dünya” mefhumunu günümüz toplumlarında sermayenin yayılmacı şekli tarafından üretilen şiddetin mantığından başlayarak anlamak daha yerinde olacaktır. Doğu ile Batı arasındaki krizin ötesinde, Kuzey ile Güney arasındaki çelişkinin ötesinde, yekünen, Ben ile Öteki'nin, kimlik ve olumsuzlamanın, iç ve dışın diyalektik değerlendirmelerinin ötesinde, belki de sermayenin ekonomik, politik, sosyal ve kültürel belirlemelerini üzerinden ürettiği yapıları, çatışma halindeki bir tekilliğin indirgenemez ontolojik niteliği olarak kavranacak farkın, deneyimlerin “tutarlılığının” hızdaki değişiklik anları sonucunda oluştuğu, bir yoğun farklılaşma üretimi olarak ele almakta fayda olacaktır. İdeolojilerin veya tarihin, küresel toplumların liberal vaatlerinin cazibesine kapılan birden çok postmodern düşünürün duyurduğu gibi, ölüp ölmediğini hiçbir zaman kesin olarak bilemeyeceğiz; ne de sanatsal olanın koşullarını kavramanın – ve can alıcı nokta da tam burası – esas itibarıyla, küreselleşmiş dünyanın vaad ettikleri arasında yer almak durumunda olan, sanat piyasası mantığı ve akla uygun olan uyarınca mümkün ve akıl kârı olup olmadığını kesin olarak bilemeyeceğiz.

Tüm bu ekonomik, politik ve estetik yapıya sahip

THREE CONSIDERATIONS ON DIFFERENCE AND THE DIFFERENTIAL OF THE AESTHETIC: À PROPOS DE ART AND THE CONTEMPORARY

José Luis Barrios

In effect, difference ceases to be reflexive and recovers an effectively real concept only to the extent that it designates catastrophes: either breaks of continuity in the series of resemblances or impassable fissures between the analogical structures. It ceases to be reflexive only in order to become catastrophic. No doubt it cannot be the one without the other. But does not difference as catastrophe precisely bear witness to an irreducible ground which continues to act under the apparent equilibrium or organic representation?

Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 35.

Preliminary

After the 2008 economic crisis in the U.S. and the downward spiral taken by the promised development of utopia in the European Union that occurred in recent times, it is ingenuous to think the divisions of the world in terms of developed economies and emerging economies; ingenuous, too, is any consideration of the enthusiasm for global societies and economies, which locate the possibility of existence as individuals and as societies within the horizon of utopia and progress. Perhaps it is more appropriate to think the notion of a “world” starting from the logics of violence produced by the expansive form of capital in today's societies. Beyond the crisis between East and West, beyond the contradiction between North and South, beyond, in sum, dialectical considerations of Self and Other, of identity and negation, of inside and outside, it might perhaps be appropriate to consider the forms in which capital produces its economic, political, social, and cultural determinations in terms of a production of an intensive differential in which the “consistency” of experiences must be thought as moments of variation of velocity that produce difference as an irreducible ontological quality of a singularity in collision. We will never be able to know for certain if indeed ideologies or history has died, as has been announced by more than one postmodern thinker fascinated by the liberal promises of global societies; neither will we be able to affirm – and this is what matters here – that it might be viable to recognize the conditions of the artistic under the logics of distribution of art and the sensible that, in principle, would seem to be a promise of the globalized world.

değerlendirmeler göz önüne alınarak geriye dönük bakıldığında bunların hepsinin –hem eleştiri, hem de dengesizlik anlamlarında– günümüzdeki küreselleşme koşulları tarafından üretilen bir krize sokma ufkuna yerleştirilmeleri gerekli olduğu belirir. Şu anda bu eylem ve onun üretimi ufkundan kaçışın olanaksız olduğu kesin olduğu gibi bu sözkonusu krizin sebep olduğu hayati istikrarsızlık halinin ve yanında taşıdığı üretilmiş farklılıkların doksanlar ve yirmi birinci yüzyılın ilk yıllarında üretilmiş olan vaatler ve beklentiler ile açıklanamayacağı da bir o kadar kesindir. Bana kalırsa bu değişim, günümüz dünyasının farklı deneyim koşulları üreten yoğunluk yapıları üzerinden şekillenerek işleyen istikrarsızlık kaidelerinin tarzı ile ilişkilidir; ve farkın mantığını farklılıklara dayalı olanın mantığı olarak kavrayabilmek için bu deneyim koşullarının incelenmesi gerekmektedir. Bunun uyarınca tekrar içindeki fark, temsilin olanaklılığı koşullarının itiraz kabul etmez bir tekilliğin işlevi olarak yeniden yapılandırılacağı sorunsal bir kategori/kavram olarak yoğun bir tekilliğin üretimidir.

Artık benzerlik ve benzeşme bilginin ve görüşün kıyaslanabilir ilkeleri değildir ve hatta modernitenin aynılıktan başkılığı, içeriden dışarıyı üreten heterotopik anda benzeşme ve fark ile açıklanamaz. Dünyanın bir küre olarak soyutlanması ile büyük ihtimale dolaşım hızının mantığına bağlı olarak yalnızca tekilliklerin çarpışmaları koşullarını düşünebilir olacağız. Bu durum uyarınca tekrar ve fark arasındaki ilişkinin estetik endeksi akla uygun olanın şekillerini düşünmemiz gerektiğini öngörür ve temsiliyeti de bir yer işgal etme koşulları üzerinden üretilen tekilleştirme olanakları açısından değerlendirmek gerekecektir. Bu halde fark, bir olayın mekansal/zamansal eşsizliği anlamında saf yer olarak ele alındığı bir yer işgal etme farklılığıdır. Anlamlandırma sistemlerinden ve göstergenin değişimlerinin mantıksal yapısından daha önce fark mekan ve zamanın yoğun maddi yapısını ifade eder, ne de olsa bunlar uzamda yer kaplayan madde ve bedenlerdir.

Ölçek ve Yoğunluk

Ölçeği idrak edilebilir bir birim (orantı, form, denge) uyarınca bir ölçü birimi olarak ele almak ölçü mefhumunu ilişkilerin duygulanımsal etkilerini hesaba katmayan ikinci dereceden bir işlem olarak kavramaktır. Bu değerlendirmenin doğası

A posteriori all these considerations of economic, political and aesthetic nature would have to be situated within the horizon of the putting-in-crisis– in the double sense of critique and instability– produced by the current condition of globalization. Although it is certain that for now it is impossible to escape the horizon of action and its production, it is also certain that the condition of vital precariousness produced by said crisis carries with it the production of differentials that cannot be explained in terms of the promise and expectation that were being produced in the nineties and the first years of the twenty-first century. This change, in my view, has to do with the mode in which the statute of precariousness of the world today unfolds in forms of intensity that produce different conditions of experience; and these conditions of experience are what would have to be explored in order to understand the logic of difference as a logic of the differential. In accordance with this, difference within repetition is the production of an intensive singularity as a problematic category/concept from which the conditions of possibility of representation are reconfigured as a function of an unimpeachable singularity.

No longer similarity and similitude as an analogous principle of knowledge and the gaze, not even similitude and difference as an heterotopic moment of the place of modernity that produces otherness from the same, the outside from the inside. In the abstraction of the world as a globe, perhaps we can only think the modes of collision of singularities within the logic of the velocity of circulation. To consider, in accordance with this, the relationship between repetition and difference in its aesthetic index presupposes that we think the forms of the sensible and representation in terms of the potencies of singularization that are produced by virtue of conditions of occupation. Difference is then the differential of occupation as a spatio-temporal uniqueness of the event as pure place. Anterior to systems of signification and the logics of the variation of the signifier, difference expresses the intensive materiality of space and time insofar as these are matter and bodies situated in space.

Scale and Intensity

To think scale, then, as a unit of measurement in accordance with an intelligible unit (proportion, form, equilibrium) is a second order operation that does not account for the notion of measurement as a potency of affection of relations.

sadece şekilsel değildir; bu öncelikle ve en önemlisi bir kavramsal düzen uyarınca yapılan bir değerlendirmedir. Ölçek basitçe matematiksel bir ölçü birimi değildir. Bu daha çok ifadeler, formlar ve figürler gibi inşa ve yapı mantığı üzerinden belirlenen içkin kuvvetlerin duygulanımsal etkilerinin çeşitlenmiş cismani niteliklerinde ortaya çıkan ilişkilene kategorisinin onun üzerinden tekrardan tanımlandığı dinamik bitişiklik bütünlüğüdür.

Bu durumda ölçeği ilişkiler üzerinden düşünmek ve tersine ilişkileri de ölçek üzerinden düşünmek tekilliklerin varoluş tarzlarının varoluşun niteliklerinin niceliksel belirteçleri olduğu anlamına gelir. Mesela küresel kentlerdeki mimarlık ve kentleşme alanındaki gelişmeleri sağlayan ölçek ilişkilerini ele alalım. Gelişmenin mantığını ütopya, form ve fonksiyon arasındaki iletişim üzerinden belirlemek yerine 2008 Pekin Olimpiyatları'nda Çin hükümetinin gerçekleştirdiği inşaatlar maskeleyen kuvvetleri ve etkilerinin mantığını düzenlemekteydi. Çin şehrinin Olimpik Havuzu ve Olimpik Stadı gibi yapılar mekânın görsel anını aşarak, beden gösterinin anıtsallığı karşısında ezildiği, bakışın fantezisel bir aşırı imalatı ile bir maskeleyen gerçekleştirmektedir. Ölçek orantıdan çok parçaların yoğunluğu ve kuvveti ile ilişkilidir. Güncel kamusal alanlarda alışveriş ve gerilim ilişkilerini tanımlayan büyük ölçüde ölçek ve yoğunluk arasındaki mantıki tersini dile getirme ilişkisidir. Gösteriler, direnişler ve sosyal yıkımlar sembolik dengesizleştirme süreçlerini işlevsel hale getiren ters yönlü yatay yoğunluklar olarak işler. Eğer ki güncel fantezisel mimaride aşırılık zamanı gözlemlenebiliyorsa bu sürecin diğer yüzü de beden ve yoğunlukların duygulanımsal olarak tekilleştirilmeleri anlamında yoğunlukta izlenebilir. Mısırlı vatandaşların yakın zamanlardaki gösterileri veya Avrupa ve Amerika'da işsizlik krizi ile yüzleşen vatandaşların İşgal Hareketi (Occupy Movement) ve 2011 yılındaki Protesto Hareketi (Indignants Movement) sadece temsil edilme konusundaki taleplerin dile geldiği anlar olarak okunamaz. Aksine, hem statik iktidar sistemlerine hem de bunların dinamik akışlarına müdahale ve karışma etkileri, tanınabilir sembolik veya söylemsel bir eksen etrafında örgütlenmiş gruplar veya hareketlerin tezahürleri olarak okunmak yerine daha yerleşmiş farklılıklarının yoğun üretimi mantığı açısından okunmaya daha uygun bir yapıya sahiptir. Bu anlamda ölçek bir orantı

This consideration is not only of a formalist nature; it is first and foremost a consideration of a conceptual order. Scale is not simply a mathematical unit of measurement. It supposes, rather, the dynamic unity of contiguity out of which is redefined the category of relation which determines the logics of construction and structure as immanent forces unfolding expressions, forms, and figures in their quality of differentiated corporealities as potencies of affection.

To think scale, then, in terms of a relation and, inversely, to think relation in terms of scale means that the modes of existence of singularities are quantitative determinants of qualities of existence. Let us think, for example, of the relations of scale that obtain with the development of architecture and urbanism in global cities. Rather than configure logics of progress in the correspondence between utopia, form, and function, the constructions made by the Chinese government for the 2008 Beijing Olympics organize logics of forces and potencies of masking. Constructions like the Chinese city's Olympic Pool and Olympic Stadium exceed the visual moment of space to produce masking as a phantasmatic overproduction of the gaze, while the body is reduced by the monumentality of the spectacle. Scale has more to do with the intensity and the force of elements than with proportion. What defines the relationships of exchange and tension in contemporary public spaces is an important part of the contraposition between scale and intensity. Demonstrations, resistances, and social subversions function as inverse forms of horizontal intensity that operationalize processes of symbolic destabilization. If the moment of excess can be observed in contemporary phantasmatic architecture, the other side of this process can be seen in intensity as an affective singularization of the body and the multitude. Demonstrations like those of Egyptian citizens in recent years, or those of European or American citizens faced with the economic crises of unemployment, known as the Occupy Movement and the Indignants Movement of 2011, cannot be read merely as moments of a demand for representation. Rather, their potency of intervention and interference, both in the static systems of power as well as in their dynamic flows, are more viably read in terms of the logic of intensive production of localized differentials than as manifestations of groups or movements organized around a recognizable symbolic or discursive axis. In this sense, scale ceases to be a problem

ve ölçü sorunu olmaktan çıkarak fark üreten bir güç haline gelir ve sadece fark içindeki tekrar yapılarını oluşturur.

Fark ve Yerleştirme: Yer

Eğer ki tekrarın sadece fark ile gerçekleştiğini teslim etmek durumdaysak, küreselleşme krizi ufkunda, fark durumunun artık onun temsil anı ile açıklanamaz olduğunu ve bu anlamda da kavram mantığı ile açıklanamayacağını anlamak esastır. Bu, Batı'nın, ilk oluştuğu zamandan bu yana, kimlik, birlik ve bütünlük arasındaki iletişimi mühürlemeye ve normalleştirmeye çalıştığı şekilde, bir somut evrensel durum ile açıklanamaz. Eğer Batı tarihi, zeminini çoğul olanı tek olanın içinde, tekil olanı evrensel olanın içinde ve birliği kimlik içinde kapsama iddiasında buluyorsa bu sadece sermaye tarafından vaad edilen kaygan soyutlama zemininin zamanının, tarihin gelişimi fikrinin ve maddeselliğin değişim değerine dönüştürülebilirliğinin çöküşüne sebep olmakla kalmaz, aynı zamanda eşsiz olanın kendi temsil koşullarını yaratmasına da imkan sağlar: bu bir tür mekânın maddeselliğinin eksiltilmesiyle ulaşılan yer üretimidir. Burada söz konusu olan, sermayenin ilahi iktidarını değer ve arzu üzerinden değiş tokuş ilişkilerini belirleyen boş bir iktidara dönüştürmek için tersine işleten bir işlemdir; imge ve kavramın içselliğini belirleyen bir ilke olarak zamanın tersine çevrilmesi ile ilgilidir. Yerin tekil olanın itiraz edilemez birliği olarak belirlediği alanda, temsil olasılığı koşullarında Batılı bilgi bilinci için çok masraflı olacak yeni bir çatlak meydana gelmektedir, ki bu çatlakta tekrar her zaman fark olarak gerçekleşir. Olay *fark* olarak gerçekleşir.

Duygu ve değer arasında açılan aralığı açıklamaya yeterli olmayan kimlik ve olumsuzlama mantığı arasındaki boşluk belki de küreselleşmeyi kuşatan tek sorundur, bu durumda krizin kaidesinin olayın kendisi, yani fark, olduğunu düşünmek gerekir: değer ve arzu arasında üretilen boşlukla yüklenmiş işgal olarak saf yer. Belki tam burada bir gizli figür şeklinde gelecek olan bir kavramı bulabiliriz: tekilliğin tekrarı olarak fark, veya başka şekilde söyleyecek olursak, beden ve onun istikrarsızlığı; bu soru, kuşkusuz, en azından *hâlâ* yaşamakta olan ve onun var olduğu yerler arasındaki entrika olarak estetiğe ilişkin merak uyandırmakta.

of proportion and measurement and becomes a potency of production of difference where it accounts for the forms of repetition only in difference.

Difference and Emplacement: Place

If we have to concede that repetition only takes place in difference, it is fundamental to understand that within the horizon of the crisis of globalization, the mode of difference can no longer be explained by its moment of representation, and in this sense it cannot be explained by the logic of the concept: it cannot be explained by the mode of the concrete universal with which the West has, since it originated, tried to seal and to normalize the correspondence between identity, unity, and totality. If the history of the West finds its basis largely in the pretension of subsuming the multiple within the one, the singular within the universal, and unity within identity, it would seem that the moment of slippery abstraction promised by capital has not only produced a collapse of the idea of the progress of history and the convertibility of materiality into exchange value, but also that it has made room for the unique to produce its own conditions of representation: a sort of production of place as a subtractive materiality of space. It is a matter here of an operation that inverts the numinous potency of capital as an empty potency determining exchange relationships in terms of value and desire; it is a matter of the inversion of time as a principle of determination of the interiority of the image and the concept. There where place appears as an unimpeachable unity of the singular is established a new fracture of the conditions of possibility of representation so expensive for the Western consciousness of knowledge, a fracture wherein repetition always occurs as difference. The event occurs as *difference*.

In the interstice where the logic of identity and negation is not sufficient to explain the interstice that is opened between affect and value, perhaps the only problem that beleaguers globalization, it would have to be thought that the statute of the crisis is the event, which is to say, difference: pure place as an occupation freighted with the emptiness produced between value and desire. Perhaps there we might find the secret figure of a concept to come: that of difference as repetition of the singularity, or if you prefer, the body and its precariousness; a question, no doubt, that, at the very least, calls for a concern for the aesthetic as an intrigue between the *still* living and its places.

RASYONALİTE VE YOLDAN ÇIKMA ARASINDA GEZİNTİ

Guillermo Santamarina
(Mushmi’me ithafen)

Sanırım “kendine mal etme” operasyonu hakkındaki polemiklerin (burada bu kavramı tırnak içine alıyorum, ama buradan sonra bu dalgalanma şelalesi içinde ne bu jargona ne de başkalarına ait kavramlar tırnaklar arasında sınırlanmayacak) bizim post-modern söylem içerisine sığdırabileceğimizden çok daha uzun, bu dönemin otuz-kırk yıl öncesinde, başkaları tarafından tanımlanan düstur karşısında yüz ekşitilerek kültür tekrar ve tekrar boyandığı zamana uzanan bir geçmişi olsa gerek.

Mesela, Yunan ve Roma paradigmaları ile desteklenen ve, kızgınlıkla dile getiriyorum, bir hegemonya temeli üzerine kurulu neo-klasik fikirleri ele alalım. Bu fikirin sözde istikrarlı, görünüşte tutarlı, bir iktidar göstergesi olarak uzak geçmişe vurulmuş farazi bir damga olması sebebiyle üzerine kurulmuş modellerin günümüzde birçok kurumsallık, devlet mimarisi veya orta sınıf evleri estetiğinde kendini dayatmaya devam ettiğini görmek şaşırtıcı değildir. Ne de, pek çoğumuz için, bunun yankılarının ve yeniden üretiminin klasikçilikle değil de sınıf düzeni ile uyum içinde olduğunu tahmin etmek güç değildir.

Ne var ki, ayın karanlık yüzünde, yediğini ağzına getirme hali bundan pek de farklı değildir. Mesela, anarşinin benmerkezci akılcılık üzerine inşa edilmiş Stirner sonrası görsel söylemi diğerlerinin üzerinde yürütülecek yaratıcı operasyonları sadece aklamakla kalmaz aynı zamanda teşvik de eder (tıpkı Dadaçıların, ya da Sitüasyonist Enternasyonel üyelerinin ve onlardan önce COBRA’nın yaptığı gibi, ve bana hâlâ öyle çok da geçmiş zamanlarda kalmış gibi gelmiyen -nafile bir çabayla yaşlanmayan sancağımı savunmaya çalışarak-yetmişlerdeki punkların usandırıcı el ilanları ve fanzinlerle yaptığı gibi) bir ikonoklazmı yoğunlaştırır, fakat ne var ki (esef içinde), bu da çok başarılı bir şekilde asimile edilerek modaya uygun bir grafik tasarım stili haline getirilir. Belki de onların kundakçılıkta kullanacakları bu alev, böylelikle onların tam da şiddetle reddettikleri gösteri toplumu tarafından tüketilmiş oluyordu.

DÉRIVE, BETWEEN RATIONALISM AND DÉTOURNEMENT

Guillermo Santamarina
(for my Mushmi)

I suppose that polemics about the operation of “appropriation” (and here I place the concept in scare quotes, but below they will no longer frame it, nor will they do for the other jargon words that appear in this cascade of fluctuations) have a much longer history than we could situate within post-modern discourse, three or four decades before this period when culture is painted and repainted with axiomatic grimaces that have been defined by others.

Let us think, for example, about neo-classical speculation, supported by Greek and Roman paradigms, and, I temper, a fundament of hegemony. It is not strange that its very models of supposed stability, of apparent coherence, of a hypothetically irreplaceable mark of the ancient past as a sign of power, continue to impose themselves today in many examples of institutionality, state architecture, or in the aesthetics of bourgeois houses. Nor is it strange, for many of us, to conjecture that its reverberations and reproductions might be congruent not with classicism, but rather with the class order.

On the dark side of the moon, none the less, the regurgitation is not much different. For example, with the post-Stirner visual discourse of anarchy, founded on an egocentric rationalism that not only justifies, but actually encourages creative operation on others’ hides (like the Dadaists did, or the members of the Situationist International, and before them COBRA, and it still seems to me that it was not so long ago – trying to defend my futilely sought after anti-senescent coat of arms – punks in the seventies, on irksome flyers and fanzines), intensifying an iconoclasm that, nevertheless (and lamentably), went on to become a very chic style of graphic design that was assimilated all too well. Thus, perhaps, was its incendiary flame consumed by the very society of the spectacle they so repudiated.

Kuşkusuz bu durum tiksindiriciydi. Moda ve fetişizmin iktidarı ile içiçe geçen tarihin yozlaşmakta olan hükümdarlığı ve bunun altında yatan cehalet ve tüketicilik üzerinden tarif edilen kimlik mefhumu; bu devasa kaos içerisindeki grotesk konformizmimiz.

Lütfen kokteyl sırasında en önde olmama müsaade edin. Buraya niye geldiğimi unuttum bile; ama bu, alkol aracılığıyla gerçeklikle yüzleşmemek için değildi. Zoraki bir gülümseme ve sonrasında bu içtenliksiz, kendini beğenmiş insanlar yığınından kaçmak için değil, bu Atina’daki Erekhtheion’dan kopyalanmış İyonik kolonlar arasında dolaşmak, bu tiksindirici evde, şimdi 156’ncısı yapılan ConArtCriB güncel sanat teorisi, eleştirisi ve böbürlenme konferansına katılanların bir araya geldiği bu anlamsız kokteyl partisine dahil olmak değildi. Şimdi niye geldiğimi hatırlıyorum, çünkü evde kalıp feryat eden, azmış bir Mushmi (yani, Duchamp’ın L.H.O.O.Q. adlı, Da Vinci’nin orospuluk eserinin reproduksiyonu üzerine -ki kimileri orada kadın kıyafetleri içindekinin Da Vinci’nin kendisi olduğunu öne sürmekte-kurşun kalem müdahalesi olan bıyıklı Mona Lisa’sı gibi kıcı kızışmış) kedi ile, ki emin olun, o anarşistlerin en rahatsız edicisi ve uzlaşmazıdır ve Diamanda Galas ile Yoko Ono karışımı birşeyin taklidini yapan herhangi bir feminist punk-rock grubundan daha boşboğazdır, ama yok, ben daha şimdiden kararımdan pişmanım. Evde kulaklarımı tıkar ve kendimi koruyabilirdim ama burada yorucu bir duruşmada işe yaramaz yükümlülöklere ve yapıbozuma maruz kalan kadın şeklinde bir sütundan daha fazlasına katlanmak zorundayım.

Sonra, bu suya sabuna dokunmayan sohbetlerden, yem olarak ortalığa saçılan şakalardan ve geceyi Lana Turner salonuna çeviren, sanki bir Sparta terasında duran DJ’in sonu gelmeyecekmiş gibi devam eden seksenler müziklerinden oluşan rutini ile uğraşmaktan yorgun düşmüş bir halde, ilgisiz oyalanma halimi büyük ihtimalle parti hudutları dışında kalan ve besbelli Taschen kitapları ile dolu üst kattaki kütüphaneye taşıdım ve burada aşağıdaki tatsız akademisyenleri daha katlanılabilir hale getirmeye yarayacak ve bu sıkıcı akşama anlam katabilecek ya da en azından bu şapşal DJ’e onların tembel ayakları için köle gibi itaatkar olmayan bir seçenek sunacak bir plak araştırmaya başladım -ve evet, zaten kafası dumanlı gezen amcanın

No doubt it was revolting: the corrupting sovereignty of history, scrambled up with the power of fashion and fetishism, and underneath, the totalitarian notion of identity through ignorance and consumerism; our grotesque conformism in this grandiose chaos.

Please let me be the first in line for a cocktail. I have forgotten why I came here, but it was not just to avoid reality through alcohol, to force a smile, and then to escape this group of insincere, immodest people, or to wander among these Ionic columns, copied from the Erechtheion in Athens, in this loathsome house where I attend a fatuous cocktail party for the attendees of the conference on contemporary art theory, criticism, and bragging, the ConArtCriB, now in its 156th edition. And now I remember that I came because I thought it better to attend than to stay at home putting up with a shrieking Mushmi in heat (meaning that she’s L.H.O.O.Q., with an ass hot like Duchamp’s mustachioed Mona Lisa, a pencil intervention on a reproduction of Da Vinci’s whoring, which, to be sure, is said to be he himself in drag), that cat, to be sure, the most strident and intransigent of all permutational anarchists, more loud-mouthed than any pussy riot imitator of Diamanda Galas crossed with Yoko Ono, but no, now I’m regretting it. There, I would have shielded myself by stopping up my ears, but here I have to bear more useless obligations and deconstructions than a caryatid in her exhausting tribunal.

Tired, then, of contending with innocuous chatter, fodder jokes, and the DJ’s infinitely routine set of eighties music there on a sort of Spartan terrace, made up tonight to look like a Lana Turner lounge, I loiter my incuriosity up to the library, which is supposed to be off limits and replete, obviously, with Taschens, and here I start hunting for some LP that might make sense of this tedious soiree, or at least to offer that dumb DJ something with which to make those insipid academics more bearable, a less obsequious option for their lazy feet – and yes, since it’s also trendy to make a display of your stoner uncle’s LPs, probably the opportunity for a timid variation on the boredom among these discs which surely matter to no one. And being irrepressibly gluttonous when it comes to any meringue, just because it’s

plaklarını sergilemek de moda olduğundan, bu muhtemelen, belli ki hiç kimsenin önemsemediği CD'ler arasındaki sıkıcı hale, çekingen de olsa bir farklılık katmak için de bir fırsattı. Ve sadece şekerli olduğu için, herhangi bir beze ile karşı karşıya gelince hissettiğim önü alınmaz oburluk ile bu erotik hiçbir yanı kalmamış parmaklarım sosyal tutarsızlık içinde titreyerek kusursuz karton kapaklar yığınının arkasına doğru ilerliyor, ki bunlar, hiç şüphenez olmasın, pek sıradışı olacağı da benzemiyor.

Gene de bunların arasında Parliament Funkadelic'in ender bulunan 1979 Paris konser kaydının eksiksiz bir kopyasına rastladım ve böylece bu nadir numuneyi içinde bulunduğu kepezelik ortamından kurtarmak için yapılması gerekli manevraları yoğun bir şekilde gözden geçirmeye başladım, ne de olsa bu evde ciddiye alınan, zevk veren ve çalınanlar Timbiriches ve Ricky Martin CD'leriydi. Bu durumda, şimdilik, bu CD yakın zamanda kimsenin kapatmayacağını tahmin ettiğim bir kapının ardında kalmaya devam edecek ve ben de keşfimi kutlamak için bir tane daha şampanya-portakal suyu içmeye yollanıyorum.

Şundan eminim ki, bundan on ya da yirmi yıl sonra yakın zamanların en iyi albümlerini seçmede uzmanlaşmış yayıncıların klasikleşmiş yıllık listeleri incelendiğinde bu listelerde yer alanların büyük bir kısmı çaresiz bir şekilde eski moda kalacak ve gözümüze olduklarından çok daha eski görünecekler ve istisnasız olarak kendimize eleştiri üstatlarının bunlarda ne bulduklarını ve nasıl bu kadar sıradışı olduğu varsayılan albümlerin bu kadar zayıf, bu kadar çocukça ve bu kadar yüksekte atan bir hava içinde olduklarını soracak ve bir dönem eleştirmenlerin ve halkın gözdesi olan hasarlı malların sayısına şaşıracağız.

Günümüzde müzik, tıpkı görsel sanatlarda olduğu gibi, genellikle üslupların türevidir. Tam da burada başarısızlığa uğrar. Ya bir yorum olur ya da bir cover. İşte her şeyin düğüm olduğu yer burası. Başkaları tarafından giyilmiş ayakkabıları giyerek yürüyor ve kendimizi ayakkabının içinde habis bir çakıl olmadığı fikrine ikna etmeye çabalyoruz. Sarmal bir dilin ve zincire vurulmuş bir kültürel tutarlılığın parçası olduğumuzu farz ediyoruz. İşte ayağımıza rahatsızlık veren çakıl taşı da bu, fakat belki de burada içinde bulunduğumuz kaosu telafi edecek cıva kadar kararsız bir cevher gizlidir:

sugar, these de-eroticized fingers of mine tremble now from the social inconsistency, proceeding to the back of a pile of immaculate cardboard covers, which, to be sure, will hardly be extraordinary.

Nevertheless, I come upon a complete copy of a rare Parliament Funkadelic concert in Paris, 1979, and with this I begin a concentrated review of the likely maneuvers needed to salvage this specimen from the ignominy in which it has wound up, in this house where what really matters, gives pleasure, and gets played are CDs by Timbiriches and Ricky Martin. So, for the moment, it will stay behind a door that I'm guessing no one will close any time soon, and I head off for one more mimosa to celebrate the discovery.

I'm convinced that when, in a decade or two, the classic annual lists of publications specializing in the selection of the best albums of recent years are reviewed, the majority of what they cover will sound irremediably dated, much older than they really are, and invariably, too, we will ask ourselves what the gurus of criticism saw in them and how such supposedly extraordinary albums could sound so weak, so puerile, or so pretentious, and we will be amazed at the quantity of damaged goods that enjoyed the favor of critics and public.

Music today, like the visual arts, is generally a derivative of styles. That's where it fails. It's either a reinterpretation, or a cover. There's the knot. We walk about in shoes that have been worn by another, trying to convince ourselves of the idea that there's no pernicious pebble in there. We presume that we are part of a spiral language, and of the coherence of a culture in chains. There's the pebble, but perhaps there's also a mercurial jewel that would redeem the chaos: the consolidation of a perpetual flow of incorporated thought/ experience.

Indeed, sometimes, too, there are some moments of promising lucidity among the professionals of appropriationism. Tired, maybe, of grappling with the paradigm of the new and the unique, and lacking the perspective necessary to separate

bu sürecin içine harmanlanmış daimi bir pekiştirici düşünce/ deneyim akışı.

Hakikaten kimi zaman bu kendine mal etme ustaları arasında ümit verici berraklık anları yaşanmaktadır. Belki de yeni ve emsalsiz olan üzerine kurulu paradigma ile boğuşmaktan yorgun ve sapı samandan ayırt edecek bakış açısından yoksun haldeki onların nüveleri (veya gerekçe ilkeleri, ya da Ouspensky'nin adlandırdığı şekilde söylemek gerekirse manyetik merkezleri) bin yıllık mutluluk bakış açısıyla iki türde özetlenebilir: dünyanın yaratılışının kederli evresi olarak kaosun asimilasyonu ve adaletli zamanların geri gelmesi kavramı “Çünkü şeylerin maddesi ve özü bozulamaz ve onun her bir parçası tüm şekillerin öznesi olmalıdır ki her parça (olabildiğince) her şey haline gelebilsin ve her şey olsun (eğer ki sonsuzluğun içinde aynı zamanda ve aynı anda değilse bile sırayla ve dönüşümlü olarak).”1

Şampanya portakal kalmamış ve bu mezcal'in de beni başka bir boyuta atlatacağını adım gibi biliyorum, ama öte yandan daha arkadaş canlısı da yapacak.

Bara birkaç adım kala kendimi hareket eden bir sürprizle karşı karşıya buluyorum. Karşımda benim sevimli Colette'im bundan otuz yıl önce de onlarca sefer yaptığı gibi en sevdiği Talking Heads şarkılarından biri ile dans etmekte. Bu Colette, onu tanımamak mümkün değil ve ben de bunu teyit eder şekilde gülümseyerek Vincent Rouge'un evinde onunla yatak odasına gittiğimiz ve onun bana “Kimsin sen? Ve çıkar şu pantolonunu!” dediği zaman suratımdaki cilveli ifadeyi takınıyorum. Fakat bu benim sevgili Colette'im olamaz, çünkü o, benim ruh ikizim, 1999 yılında bizi terk edeli beri, bedeni kül renginde, Cenova'da bir gölde yüzüyor.

Daha yakından bakınca bu kızın, benim arkadaşım ile tanıştıgımda onun olduğu gibi, 20 yaşın az üzerinde olduğunu fark ediyorum. Eğer ki şimdi hayatta olsaydı cildi bu kadar parlak olamazdı, çünkü o eline geçen her adi puroyu içerdi. Saçları, teni benim arkadaşımın bronzluğunu aratmayacak kadar muhteşem olan bu dilberinki gibi gür olmazdı. Fakat aman Allahım, dans edişi tıpatıp aynı, sigarayı tutuşu tıpkısının aynısı ve (bana bir kedi mırıltısını anımsatan) sesi, her ne kadar Colette'ten daha iyi Fransızca konuşuyor olsa da, tamı tamına aynı koduğumun sesi.

the wheat from the chaff, their nucleus (or their guidelines for justification, or their magnetic center, as Ouspensky calls it) can be summarized in two millenarian perspectives: the assimilation of chaos, as the dismal stage of the creation of the world, and in the concept of the fair return, “For the matter and substance of things is incorruptible and every part of it must be the subject of every form, so that every part can become every thing (insofar as it is able), and be every thing (if not in the same time and instant of eternity, successively and alternately).”1

There are no more mimosas, and I already know this mezcal is going to catapult me into another dimension, though it'll also make me more sociable.

A few steps from the bar I find myself facing a moving surprise. Here is my adorable Colette, dancing to one of her favorite Talking Heads songs, just as happened before on a dozen or more occasions, thirty years ago. It's Colette, it's impossible not to recognize her, and confirming it, I smile and make that flirtatious face like when I went into a bedroom at Vincent Rouge's house and she said, “Who are you! And take your pants off!” But it can't be my adored Colette, because she, my soul sister, is swimming in a lake in Geneva, ashen since 1999, when she left us.

When I look more closely I realize that this girl is a little over 20 years old, like my friend was when I met her. If she were still alive now her skin wouldn't be so radiant, mostly because she used to smoke any old coarse cigar. Her hair wouldn't be as thick as this beauty's, whose tan, like hers, is exquisite. But wow, she dances exactly the same way, she holds her cigarette exactly the same way, and her voice, albeit in a better French than Colette's (which seemed to me then like the purring of a cat) is exactly the same fucking voice.

“Hey, sweetheart, you remind me of a friend of mine,” I said when we found ourselves receiving our next round of that Zapotec elixir. With an enormous smile she answered that she'd heard that more than twenty times since she arrived

“Hey, güzelim, bana bir arkadaşımı hatırlatıyorsun,” dedim kendimizi bir sonraki tur Zapotek iksirini içerken bulduğumuzda. Kocaman gülümsemesiyle, birkaç gün önce Paris’e geldiğinden beri bunu yirmi kereden fazla duyduğunu söyleyerek cevap verdi. Ve onunla hiç karşılaşmamış olmasına rağmen kim ile kıyaslandığını biliyordu. “Ben de onun yörüngesini araştırıyorum çünkü tesadüf bu ya ben de bir küratörüm.”

Kendimi, giderek işe yaramaz Sid Vicious’ın karizmasına doğru yol alan bu tuhaf muhabbetten, o on dokuzuncu yüzyıl İskoç işi taklidi ahşap kapının ardında gizli duran ganimetime bakmak üzere uzaklaştırdım. Onu ne idüğü belirsiz, (kapının tersine, kimliği belirsiz bir Milanolu tasarımcıya ithafen kendini geleceğe ışınlamaya çabalayan) bir kitaplığın kenarına taşıdım ve manevrayı tamamlayıp da kendime de bir çeki düzen verir vermez Colette 2 çıkageldi ve o mırıltıyı andıran sesiyle benden ona George Clinton’un yeteneği ve hayal gücünün ürünü olan Parliament grubunun Mothership Connection adlı performansının ardındaki fikri hatırlatmamı istedi.

Çılgın bir topluluğun parti yaparak eğlenmesi esnasında ortaya çıkan bir ütopyik sayıklama ile Kuzey Amerika’ya siyahi kölelerin sevkıyatı (o ilkelerin morfolojisi ve kültürü uyarınca doğrudan Doğa Ana’nın kökünün kazanması) ile yeni bir ırkın ortaya çıkacağı teyid edilirken bunun yanı sıra o tarihi dönüm noktasından itibaren bu bir kitlesel göçe de sebep olacaktı: ilk başlarda açlık, cehalet, sömürü ve zulüm ile kuşatılmış olarak ve bunları takiben iğrenç ahlaksızlıklar, fuhuş ile damgalanmışlık, aşırı mahrumiyet kefenleri içinde ve hapislerde tutsak edilme sebepleriyle tahakküm ve tamamen aşağılanma koşulları içinde bulunanlar, nihayet mucizevi bir kozmik hizalanmanın gerçekleşmesiyle bir başka karnavalımsı ve özgürlükçü gerçekliğe erişim hakkı kazanacaklardı. Ve böylece, bu tanrısallaştırılma anının temsiliyle, ortalık orospular ve pezevenkler ile dolup taşarken, gitarların ritmik şevki ve psikedelik patlayışları arasında, doldurulmuş hayvanlar, tüyler ve ışıklar ile çevrelenmiş olarak Mothership huzura çağrılacak ve ihtişamlı, günahlardan arındıran konsere alçalarak inecekti.

“Bir zamanlar şimdi dediğimiz zamanda Dünya yüzüne yayılmış bir günah varmış, doğrusu bu Yüce Tanrı’nın

in Paris a couple days before. And she even knew to whom she was being compared, even though she never met her. “I’m researching her trajectory because, coincidentally, I’m a curator, too.”

I detached myself from the bizarre conversation, which had taken a turn toward the charisma of the useless Sid Vicious, to go take a look at my loot, hidden behind the imitation nineteenth-century Scotch woodwork door. I relocated it to one side of a shadowy bookshelf (which, by contrast, tried to project itself into the future, after an uncertain Milanese designer), and no sooner had I reincorporated myself after the operation than Colette 2 reappeared to ask me, in her purring tone, to remind her of the concept behind the performance of Parliament’s Mothership Connection, a product of the talent and imagination of George Clinton.

A utopian delirium that came out of the partying of a funky commune, which in addition to affirming that a new race (based in the morphology and culture of that primitive, the direct extirpation of Mother Earth) emerged when the shipment of black slaves to North America began, which, from that crucial historical moment on, would give rise to an exodus: first besieged by hunger, ignorance, exploitation, and total outrage; followed by conditions of subjugation and total humiliation, by way of atrocious vices, the stigma of prostitution, and confinement in shrouds of extreme deprivation and jails, in order finally, through a miraculous cosmic alignment, to gain access to another, carnivalesque, and liberatory reality. And so, it is in the representation of that moment of apotheosis, with whores and pimps galore, in the rhythmic fervor and the psychedelic outburst of guitars, stuffed animals, feathers and lights, that the Mothership will be summoned, and descend into the glorious, redeeming concert.

“In once upon a time called right now, there was a sin that spread across the face of Earth, indeed a true departure from the way the Great One had intended it. The unknown Great One has watched over our earth ever since he placed his greatest gift of Funkitude inside the pyramids over 5,000

amaçladığından uzaklaşan gerçek bir sapmamış. Meçhul Yüce Tanrı bundan 5000 sene önce piramitlerin içine Funklık hediyesini bırakalı beri dünyamızı koruyup kolluyor. Fakat bu dünyanın insanları bu hediye açık yüreklilikle kabul etmediler ve Funk’ın amacı yıllar içinde yıprandı. Her şeyi birleştiren gerçek Funk’ın ucuz taklitleriyle ve yanıltıcı uyarlamalarıyla yetinir hale geldik. Ama Yüce Tanrı merhamet ederek kulaklarımıza bir çare sundu. Mothership’e hoşgeldiniz, funkatojinin nihai uç noktası. O bir kez daha Pyramids’i ele geçirmek üzere geri geldi ve tek bir saniye bile geç kalmadan çünkü biz dehşetli bir devletiz. Doğa Ana’nın tüm çocukları bunu hissedebilir; kalçalarından yüreklerine kadar her yerlerinde dünyadaki Funk’ın muhteşem olanaklarını tamamen gerçekleştiremediğini bilirler. Mothership’in pilotu Star Child baştan başa her yerde saf Phunk tohumlarını ekmenin zamanı geldiğini beyan ediyor. Ve Mothership Connection’a bağlanarak olayın içyüzünü görebileceğiniz bir bakış açısına sahip olma olanağına kavuştunuz, yani sırtınıza yaslanın ve değişim dalgalarının kulaklarınızdan içeri girmesine izin verin!!”

İçki masası ile (o sırada kendini mide bulandırıcı günümüz Meksika pop müziğine gömmüş olan) canlı olduğu şüpheli DJ arasındaki doğaçlama dans pisti bir anda sessizliğe gömüldü. Bu reenkarnasyon ve ben durumu fırsat bilip bu çirkin ortamın koleksiyoneri, sahibi ve tasarımcısı olan kişinin Basel Miami ve Miami Buenos Aires’ten topladığı yakın zamanda elde edilen eserleri ziyaret etmek ve görmek üzere bir süre önce topladığımız sanat galerisine yöneldik.

Kendimizi Pepe Helguera’nın şarkı söyleyişini görme utancından tam zamanında kurtararak Philippe Starck’ın hayaletlerinin kol gezdiği, Salvadorlu yeni tanınmakta olan bir sanatçının multimedya eserinin bulunduğu ve bunlara işitsel olarak da çok huzursuz bir Finlandiyalı komşunun osuruklarının eşlik ettiği uzun bir koridora girdik.

“Ne kadar sevimsiz bir ev,” diyerek yorum yaptı o sigara içmekten boğuk sesiyle Colette’in methiyeye değer kopyası. “Ve ne kadar yavan bir sanat.”

“Adın ne?”

years ago. But the people of this world have not accepted his gift with sincere hearts, and the purpose of Funk has been torn over the years. We have become complacent with cheap imitations and deluded versions of the one true Funk that unifies all. But through the grace of the great One, he has delivered a solution unto our eardrums. Welcome to the Mothership, the final frontier of funkatology. It has once again returned to reclaim the Pyramids, and not a moment too late as we are a dire state. All of the children of mother earth can feel it; from their hips to their hearts they know that the funk of the world has fallen short of its grand possibilities. The Mothership’s pilot, Star Child, has proclaimed it is time to reseed its pure Phunk throughout the land. And by tuning in to the Motherhsip Connection you have allowed yourself an insider’s perspective on the dig, so sit back and welcome the waves of change into your ears!!”

The improvised dance floor, between the drink table and that corpse of a DJ (who by then had poured himself into nauseating contemporary Mexican pop) went suddenly silent. This reincarnation and I took the opportunity to direct ourselves to the art gallery, which had, shortly before, convened us to visit and see the recently acquired pieces that the collector, owner, and designed of this ugly site had accrued in Basel Miami and in Miami Buenos Aires.

Just in time to spare ourselves the embarrassment of seeing Pepe Helguera sing, we entered a long hallway that was traversed by the ghosts of Philippe Starck, a multimedia work by an emerging Salvadoran, aurally accompanied by the sounds of farts, the latter being a creation by a very restless Finnish neighbor.

“What an unpleasant house,” commented my much lauded facsimile of Colette in her hoarse smoker’s voice. “And what prosaic art.”

“What’s your name?”

“My name is Melody... Melody Nelson.”

“Benim adım Melody... Melody Nelson.”

“??”

“Babamın Gainsbourg’dan satın aldığı bir Ferrari’si vardı, ve ona olan bağlılığı yavaş yavaş arabayı bir kahve çekirdeğine dönüştürdü. Hah!”

“Peki ya annen? Onun Meksikalı olma ihtimali var mı?”

“Neden? O İsviçreli’dir. Beni o Ferrari’nin koltuğu ile bir çayır arasında doğurmuş, tesadüf eseri değil daha çok kasıtlı bir vesile sonucu. Onun adı da Maria.”

Biz bir dizi birbiri ile ilişkisiz heykel arasında sürüklenirken sohbet de giderek kimlik kavramına yöneldi.

Kendini daha önce başka birinin tasavvur ettiği bir yaratıcı nesne aracılığıyla (Kinik Diyojen’in ruhuna uygun olacak şekilde) ifade etme çabasını açıklayacak sağlam bir gerekçe (bunun mutlak haklılığını ispatlayacak olmasa dahi, ki bu söylenmesi ve yapılması gerekenin ne zaman ve nerede istenirse istensin söylenmesi ve yapılması özgürlüğü olsa gerek) büyük ihtimalle kimlik ve ortak dil arasındaki ilişkide bulunabilir. Bu davranışlar (Constant Nieuwenhuys’un Sitüasyonist kavramı uyarınca) psikocoğrafyaların uyumunu şekillendirir ve böylelikle bilginin organik gelişiminin belli derecelerini belirler. Ve bunlar yalnızca özgürlük yanılması değildir, ne de grafitide veya müstehcen bir tavır ile umumi bir hela kabininin duvarındaki karalamada olabileceği gibi bastırılmış ve zihin karışıklığı içindeki arzuların basitçe yansıtılmalarıdır. Bunlar yalnızca tembelliğin kaba bir şekilde telaffuz edilmesi değildir, ne de sömürü ile, aptallaştırın iş, marjinalizasyon, tüketim ürünlerinin ve medyanın yabancılaştırıcılığı ile yüzleşen çarpık bir politik taktikdir, ne de ruhsuz politik bir bıkkınlık, ama tam da bunlardır, her ne kadar sanatın itkisi ve tanımından kaynaklanıyor olsalar ve yerleşik düzenin üzerinde en ufak bir leke bile bırakmayan basit, tepkisel bir marka haline gelseler bile.

Kendine mal etme davranışının veya öznenin cephesine daha önce başlatılan argümana devam niteliğinde bir eklenti yapmanın yapısı da evrim söylemi içinde yer alır. Belki saldırgan, belki saygısız fakat tamamıyla düşüncesizce

“??”

“My father had a Ferrari that he bought from Gainsbourg, and his devotion has been turning it little by little into a coffee bean. Ha!”

“And your mother? Was she Mexican by any chance?”

“Why? She’s Swiss. She gave birth to me between the seat of the Ferrari and a meadow, not by accident, but from a premeditated opportunity. Her name is Maria.”

The conversation then went on toward the concept of identity, while we drifted among a succession of disparate sculptures.

One probably solid basis (if not its absolute justification, which could be the freedom to say and do what needs to be said and done, whenever and wherever one wants) for the exercise of expressing oneself within a creative object that someone else had previously conceived (in accordance with the spirit of Diogenes the Cynic), is to be found in the link between identity and shared language. These gestures configure the congruence of psychogeographies (in accordance with Constant Nieuwenhuys’s Situationst concept) and, consequently, certain scales of organic development of knowledge. And they are not merely the illusion of freedom, nor the easy projection of repressed or confused desires, as can happen with graffiti, or with an obscene gesture scrawled on the wall of stall in a public bathroom. They are not merely the brutal articulation of idleness, nor the oblique political tactic that confronts exploitation, stupefying labor, marginalization, the alienation of consumer products and the media, nor flat political boredom, which is what it is, even if it originates in the impulse and the definition of art, and even if it possibly results in a simple, reactionary brand name that leaves not the slightest blemish on the status quo.

The structure of the gesture of appropriation, or of inserting into the subject’s façade a sequel to the argument that she or he began, is also a discourse of evolution. Aggressive,

değil çünkü bu da bizim insan olma niteliğimizin, iletişim kurma kapasitemizin bir sonucudur. Bu her ne kadar saf ve toy bir davranış da olsa, ya da estetik haricindeki tüm diğer alanların bakış açıları tarafından kökten gerekçesiz bile bulunsa, şu anda içinde bulunduğu kaotik durum içerisinde toplumun ancak nostaljik olarak hayata geçirebilir gibi görüldüğü ahlaki ve manevi fikirler olan eşitlik ve özgürlüğü yüceltmektedir.

Melody Nelson bir Warhol eseri karşısında mest olarak kıvrınmakta olan kocasını bulmak üzere uzaklaştı. Yol boyunca bu koleksiyonun çöküş ve kendi kendini yok etme ile ilişkili olduğunun farkına vardım ve büyük ihtimalle sahiplerinin bundan haberi bile yoktu. Hatta, biraz ileride onlardan birinin sırasıyla her bir eseri onu yapan kişinin adını söyleyerek tanıttığına kulak misafiri oldum. Bir Catellan eseri! Neredeyse dizlerinin üzerinde, sanki belirsiz bir yerde bulunan bir tapınağa hac görevini yerine getirir gibi kararsız ve ne yaptığı belli olmayan hareketlerle dolanıyordu. Ben yine de bir koyun gibi kendini beğenmişlik gösterisini izleyeceğime bu androidi takip etmeyi yeğliyorum.

İleride gecenin bir diğer büyük sürprizi beni bekliyor. Burada bir kaidenin üzerinde yetmişlerden bir minimalistin imzasını taşıyan bir ürün durmakta: bir yanı üzerinde yatan, pekala Constantin Brancusi’nin olabilecek bir baş. Fakat ne büyük gaddarlık, üzerinde muazzam derecede çok siyah plastik parçacıkları. Tüm çevresini sarmışlar, boynunu, çenesini, alnının tepesini, şakaklarını, gözlerinin içinde bile varlar, böylece bu sivri uçlu dikenler her taraftan sürgün vererek her kim ona yaklaşıp dokunmayı göze alacak olursa onu yaralamaya hazır duruyorlar. Kimileri bu dayatma dışlayıcılık halini saldırgan bulabilir sanırım. Fakat o da ne! Tüm bu parçacıklar tam da benim daha önce yürütmekte olduğum Parliament plağından geliyor!

Sanki bu da yetmezmiş gibi, bu müdahale edilmiş Uyuyan İlham Perisi’nin burun deliklerinden birinin içinde de yirmi dolarlık banknottan sarılarak yapılmış küçük bir boru var. Ne kadar tuhaf.

perhaps, disrespectful, perhaps, but not entirely imprudent, because it is a consequence of a human quality, of our capacity for communication. And even though this may be ingenuous, or radically unjustified from the perspective of all other dimensions outside of the aesthetic, it exalts the ethical and moral arguments of the equality and liberty that society, in its current, chaotic condition, seems only to live nostalgically.

Melody Nelson went to catch up with her husband, who was writhing in ecstasy before a Warhol. Along the way I noticed that this collection is quite linked to decadence and self-destruction, and its owners probably don’t even realize it. In fact, I hear one of them up ahead, introducing each thing by the name of its author. A Cattelan! He wanders erratically about on his knees, as if on a pilgrimage to a temple of unknown location. I prefer to follow this android rather than continue on like a sheep on the trail of the vanity fair.

Up ahead, the other great surprise of the night. Here, on a pedestal, is a product signed by a minimalist from the seventies: lying on its side, a head that could well have been Constantin Brancusi’s. But what an atrocity, an enormous quantity of black plastic fragments. They’re encrusted all over it, on its neck, its chin, the high part of its forehead, its temple, even inside its eyes, so that all over pointy spines sprout up and outward, sure to wound whomever might dare to touch it. Some might regard this imposed condition of exclusion as violent, I think. And what’s this! All these pieces come from the very Parliament record I was stealing earlier!

As if that weren’t enough, inside one of the nostrils of this intervened Sleeping Muse, there is a little tube made from a rolled up twenty dollar bill. How bizarre.














A large, rectangular, white object, possibly a piece of paper or a small screen, is mounted on the wall below the medium television. It contains several lines of text, which are mostly illegible due to the image quality. The text appears to be organized into columns.







SANATÇILAR / ARTISTS

Rossella Biscotti

François Bucher

Tania Bruguera

Jeremy Deller

Leticia El Halli Obeid

Jon Mikel Euba

Iain Forsyth & Jane Pollard

Mario García Torres

Sanja Iveković

Martin Jenkinson

Magdalena Leite

Jorge Méndez Blake

Fabio Morais

Vicente Razo

Danh Vo

Ming Wong

Artur Zmijewski



Rossella Biscotti

Il Processo / Dava, 2010 - devam eden
Ses enstalasyonu 06:00:00
Simültane çevirmen ile performans
Sanatçının izniyle

Il Processo / The Trial, 2010 - ongoing
Audio installation 06:00:00
Performance with simultaneous translator
Courtesy of the artist



François Bucher

Daima Canlı: K. Gun Vakası, 2006
Video Enstalasyon, 00:18:00
Sanatçı ve Proyectos Monclova, Meksika izniyle

Live Forever: The Case of K. Gun, 2006
Video Installation, 00:18:00
Courtesy of the artist and Proyectos Monclova, Mexico





Tania Bruguera

Homenaje a Ana Mendieta / Ana Mendieta'ya Adanmış, 1985-1996
Yeniden üretilmiş eserlerin fotografik dökümantasyonu
Studio Bruguera izniyle

Homenaje a Ana Mendieta / Tribute to Ana Mendieta, 1985-1996
Photographic documentation of re-creation of works
Courtesy of Studio Bruguera

©Gonzalo Vidal Alvarado







Jeremy Deller

Orgreave Muharebesi, 2001

Video, 01:02.37

Yönetmen: Mike Figgis. Artangel ve Channel 4 ortak yapımı

The Battle of Orgreave, 2001


Video, 01:02.37

Directed by Mike Figgis.Co-Commissioned by Artangel and Channel 4



Handwritten text in German, likely a fragment of a letter or a note, written in a cursive script.

Handwritten text in German, enclosed within a large, irregular oval shape. The text includes words like "Schach" and "Spiel".



Handwritten text in German, enclosed within a large, irregular oval shape. The text includes words like "Eius Dämonische" and "Spiel".

Leticia El Halli Obeid

La letra de B / B'nin Elyazısı, 2012
Kağıt üzerine mürekkep

Walter Benjamin'in Arşivi'nden alınmış Walter Benjamin'in elyazısının bir dizi kopyası, Güzel Sanatlar Akademisi, Berlin
Sanatçının izniyle

B's Handwriting, 2012
Ink on paper

Series of copies of Walter Benjamin's handwriting taken from the Walter Benjamin's Archive, Fine Arts Academy, Berlin
Courtesy of the artist



Jon Mikel Euba

Zamansal birimler üzerinden temsil edilen mekansal eşitlikler sistemi. Re:horse'da kamera kullanan kişi için notlar, 2011
Karışık medya
Sanatçının izniyle

Spatial Equivalence System represented by temporal units. Notes for the camera-person in Re:horse, 2011
Mixed Media
Courtesy of the artist



Jon Mikel Euba

Norm karşıtı. B eşittir D1. Re:horse'da kamera kullanan kişi için notlar, 2011
Karışık medya
Sanatçının izniyle

Counter-rule. B equals D1. Notes for the camera-person in Re:horse, 2011
Mixed Media
Courtesy of the artist



Jon Mikel Euba

Mekansal eşitlikler sistemi (tanım) Re:horse'da kamera kullanan kişi için notlar, 2011
Karışık medya
Sanatçının izniyle

Spatial Equivalence System (definition) Notes for the camera-person in Re:horse, 2011
Mixed Media
Courtesy of the artist



Jon Mikel Euba

Norm. B eşittir B1. Re:horse'da kamera kullanan kişi için notlar, 2011
Karışık medya
Sanatçının izniyle

Rule B equals B1. Notes for the camera-person in Re:horse
Mixed Media
Courtesy of the artist




Iain Forsyth & Jane Pollard

Nauman'ımı Öp, 2007
Dört Kanal, Video Enstalasyon, 00:47:00
Sanatçı ve Kate MacGarry, Londra izniyle

Kiss My Nauman, 2007
Four Channels, Video Installation, 00:47:00
Courtesy of the artists and of Kate MacGarry, London




More than three decades had past since some of the former students had last been in Halifax.



As of today, they are the only people who could tell if such an immaterial piece still exists.



If so, it exists among them.



Maybe one of these days they will recall the long gone idea.

Mario Garcia Torres

Halifax'ta Olan Halifax'ta Kalır (1969 NSCAD Proje Sınıfı buluşması. Ekim 11-13), 2005
50 adet siyah-beyaz fotoğraf projeksiyonu
Sanatçı ve Proyectos Monclova, Meksika izniyle

What Happens in Halifax Stays in Halifax (1969 NSCAD's Project Class reunion. Oct. 11-13), 2005
50 black and white photography projection
Courtesy of the artist and Proyectos Monclova, Mexico

Sanja Iveković
Eve'in Oyunu, 2009
Performansın Belgelenmesi
Sanatçı ve Mudam Luxembourg izniyle

Eve's Game, 2009
Documentation of performance
Courtesy of the artist and Mudam Luxembourg





Magdalena Leite

Cover, 2010 - devam eden, 00:25:00
Performans dökümantasyonu
Sanatçının izniyle

Cover, 2010 - ongoing, 00:25:00
Documentation of performance
Courtesy of the artist



Jorge Méndez Blake

Dünyadan Yıldızlara Kolay Bir Yol Yoktur, 2010
Cam elyafı and epoksi, 132 x 139 x 105 cm
Edisyon 1/3
Sanatçı ve Galeria OMR, Meksiko izniyle

There's No Easy Way From the Earth to the Stars, 2010
Fiberglass and epoxy resin, 132 x 139 x 105 cm
Ed. 1/3
Courtesy of the artist and Galeria OMR, Mexico



Jorge Méndez Blake

Dünyadan Yıldızlara Kolay Bir Yol Yoktur IV, 2011
Kağıt üzerine kalem ve boya kalemi, 150 x 120 cm
Geoffroy ve Karolin GUICHARD Koleksiyonu
Sanatçı ve Galeria OMR, Meksiko izniyle

There's No Easy Way From the Earth to the Stars IV, 2011
Pencil and color pencil on paper, 150 x 120 cm
Coleccion Geoffroy y Karolin GUICHARD
Courtesy of the artist and Galeria OMR, Mexico



Fabio Morais

Carta a um jovem poeta / Genç Bir Şaire Mektup, 2003
 Kendine mal edilmiş el yazmalarından kolaj
 Herbiri 31 x 21,5 cm (6'lı poliptyk)
 Özel Koleksiyon, São Paulo. Galeria Vermelho, São Paulo izniyle

Carta a um jovem poeta / Letter for a young poet, 2003
 Collage of appropriated handwritings
 31 x 21,5 cm each (polyptych of 6)
 Private Collection, São Paulo. Courtesy of Galeria Vermelho, São Paulo

1908, 12 de fevereiro, p. 743

Resposta

Adia, sendo de acordo com o que se viu
pelo dia 12. Uma vez que o dia 12 é grande
o dia 12 é grande. Poderá ser mais para não
fazer uma coisa de dia 12, que talvez
a crítica, que sempre acontece, e talvez
uma coisa de dia 12. O dia 12 é grande
e talvez seja grande. A crítica sempre se
faz de dia 12. O dia 12 é grande. A crítica
sempre se faz de dia 12. O dia 12 é grande.
A crítica sempre se faz de dia 12. O dia 12
é grande. A crítica sempre se faz de dia 12.
O dia 12 é grande. A crítica sempre se faz
de dia 12. O dia 12 é grande. A crítica
sempre se faz de dia 12. O dia 12 é grande.

na. Um agradecimento
confiança. Poderá mais
em considerações sobre
pós socialismo a toda
crítica. Não há nada
em uma obra de arte do
que sempre resultam em
na crítica. A obra



The classic social specialization,
the specialization of power



The spectacle is capital
at such degree of accumulation



Man separated from his own production,
produces even more



the division of social labor
and agent of class domination

Vicente Razo

La Sociedad del Espectáculo. Versión de Interés General /
Gösteri Toplumu. Genel İlgiye Yönelik Edisyon, 2011
DVD, renkli ve siyah-beyaz, ses
01:29:00
Sanatçının izniyle

La Sociedad del Espectáculo. Versión de Interés General /
The Society of Spectacle. General Interest Edition, 2011
DVD, colour and B/W, sound
01:29:00
Courtesy of the artist

20 janvier 1861.

P. M. J.

Fris cher, très honoré et bien-aimé Père,

Quisque vos sentons se fait encore attendre, je vous
vous adresser un nouvel adieu, qui sera probablement le dernier.
Les jours de ma prison s'écoulent paisiblement. Tous ceux
qui m'entourent m'honorent, un bon nombre m'aiment. Depuis
le grand mandarin jusqu'au dernier soldat, tous respellent
que la loi du royaume me condamne à la mort. Il n'a
point eu à endurer de tortures, comme beaucoup de mes frères.
Un léger coup de sabre sépare ma tête, comme une fleur
printanière que le Maître du jardin cueille pour son plaisir.
Nous sommes tous des fleurs plantés sur cette terre que Dieu
cueille en son temps, un peu plus tôt, un peu plus tard.
Autre est la rose impourpée, autre le lys virginal, autre
l'humble violet. Faisons tous de plaisir, selon le cultum ou
l'état qui nous sont donnés, au souverain Seigneur et Maître.

Je vous souhaite, cher Père, une longue, paisible et
continue vieillesse. Portez doucement la croix de cette vie, à
la suite de Jésus, jusqu'au calvaire d'un heureux trépas.
Père et fils se rejoignent au paradis. Moi, petit éphémère, je
m'en vais le premier. Adieu.

Votre très dévoué et respectueux fils

J. Théophile Vénard

Danh Vo

2.2.1861, 2009 - devam eden
Aziz Théophane Vénard'ın başı vurulmadan önce babasına yazdığı son mektubun Phung Vo tarafından yazılmış kopyası.
Eserin başlığı ve varolan kopyaların sayısı Phung Vo ölünceye kadar belirsizdir
Kağıt üzerine mürekkep
Özel Koleksiyon

2.2.1861, 2009 - ongoing
Last letter of Saint Théophane Vénard to his father before he was decapitated copied by Phung Vo.
Title and number of existing copies remains undefined until the death of Phung Vo
Ink on paper
Private Collection

20 Ocak 1861

Çok değerli, saygın ve sevgili Babacığım,

İdam hükmümün uygulanmasını beklerken, sonuncu olacağını düşündüğüm bu mektubu yazarak size veda etmek istiyorum. Hapishanedeki yaşamımı huzur içinde devam ettiriyorum. Çevremde bana saygı duyan ve beni seven insanlar var. En üst seviyeli komutandan en basit ere kadar, herkes, ülke krallığının yasalarının beni ölüme mahkum etmiş olmasına üzülüyor. Ben diğer arkadaşlarımla çoğunun çektiği işkencelere maruz kalmadım. Vakti geldiğinde, keskin bir kılıç darbesi, bahçıvanın kestiği bir bahar çiçeği gibi, kafamı bedenimden ayıracak.

Kimimiz kırmızı bir gül, kimimiz saf bir zambak, kimimiz alçak gönüllü bir menekşe gibi, bazılarımız daha erken, bazılarımız daha geç, ama hepimiz, Tanrı'nın bahçesinden keserek topladığı çiçekler gibi, vakti geldiğinde bu dünyadan ayrılacağız. Çiçekler gibi güzel rayihamızla ve çarpıcı renklerimizle, kendimizi, bizi yaratan yüce Tanrı'ya beğendirmeye çalışalım.

Sevgili Babacığım, size uzun, huzurlu ve erdemli bir yaşlılık temenni ederken, bu dünyayı terk etme zamanı gelene kadar, hayatın çilelerini ve sıkıntılarını, İsa Peygamberimizin sırtında taşıdığı haç gibi, cesaretle taşımanızı dilerim. Baba ve oğul olarak Cennet'te buluşacağımız günü beklerken, bu dünyayı sizden önce terk ediyorum ve size Elveda demek istiyorum

Size sonsuz sevgi ve saygıyla bağlı olan oğlunuz

J. Théophile Vénard

20 January 1861

Valuable, honourable and beloved Father,

While my sentence is still to be carried out I would like to address another farewell which would probably be my last. My days in prison flow peacefully. All those around me admire me, and a good number of them like me. From the highest rank officer to the lowest rank soldier everyone regrets that the law of the kingdom has condemned me to death. I did not have to endure the tortures that many of my friends have. A light blow of the sabre will separate my head like a spring flower that the gardener picks for pleasure. We are all flowers on this earth that God picks; some a little earlier, some a little later. Some like purple coloured roses, some like virgin lilies, some like humble violets. Let us all try to please the almighty lord and master, as the perfume or the brilliance of the flowers please us.

I wish you, dear father, a long, peaceful and virtuous old age. Carry gently the load of this life, just like Jesus carried the cross, until the ordeal of a contented death. Father and son shall meet again in heaven. I, the little fleeting one, am going first. Farewell.

Your devoted and respectful son,

F. Théophile Vénard





Ming Wong

Bienvenido Mr. Wong / Hoşgeldiniz Bay Wong, 2009
Video, 00:01:50; 00:04:16
Sanatçının izniyle

Bienvenido Mr. Wong / Welcome Mr. Wong, 2009
Video, 00:01:50; 00:04:16
Courtesy of the artist





Artur Zmijewski

Tekrar, 2005
Enstalasyon, tek kanal video
39.17 dak., renkli, sesli
Ed. 3 + 1 AP + 1 EP
Sanatçı, Galerie Peter Kilchmann Zurich ve Foksal Gallery Foundation, Varşova izniyle

Repetition, 2005
Installation, single channel video,
39.17 min., color, sound
Ed. of 3 + 1 AP + 1 EP
Courtesy of the Artist, Galerie Peter Kilchmann Zurich, and Foksal Gallery Foundation, Warsaw

Rossella Biscotti (İtalya, 1978)

Esas olarak hareketli görüntüler, performans, heykel ve metin ile çalışır. Eserleri ülkesinin yakın tarihindeki özgürlük özlemi ve iktidar için kullanılan kontrol stratejileri konularıyla ilgilidir. Kişisel sergi açtığı yerler arasında CAC Vilnius (2012); Fondazione Galleria Civica di Trento (2010); ve Nomad Foundation, Roma (2009) bulunmaktadır; bunlara ek olarak katıldığı organizasyonlar arasında MAXXI Ulusal 21. Yüzyıl Sanatı Müzesi, Roma (2010 - 11); Witte de With, Rotterdam (2010); Museu Serralves, Porto (2010); ve Manifesta 9 (2012), Documenta 13 (2012) yer almaktadır. 2010 yılında Italia Arte Contemporanea Ödülü'ne layık görülmüştür.

Francois Bucher (Kolombiya, 1972)

Bucher 1999 ve 2000 yıllarında New York'taki Whitney Bağımsız Çalışma Programı'na katıldı. 1999 yılında Chicago Sanat Enstitüsü'nde Yüksek Lisansını tezi için bir ödül olarak tamamladı. VideoEx, 2003, Zürih birincilik ödülü; Latin Amerika, Prime Videocreation Ödülü ve Werkleitz Ödülü, Transmediale, 2004, Berlin de dahil olmak üzere birçok ödüle layık görüldü. Video eserlerinden bazıları Rotterdam Film Festivali; Transmediale, Berlin, 2004, 2005; Lincoln Center'da New York Video Festivali, 2002 ve Tate Gallery, Turner Prize Film Programı, 2002, Londra'da gösterilmiştir. Video çalışmaları sürekli olarak iktidar inşası, ve bunun yanı sıra tarih, siyaset ve sinema filmlerinden televizyona geçişi konu almaktadır. Kendisi Berlin'de yaşıyor ve çalışıyor.

Tania Bruguera (Küba, 1968)

Enstalasyondan, sosyal müdahaleye ve en çok da dikkat çekici performanslarına uzanan disiplinlerarası çalışmalarıyla Bruguera, sanatın günlük siyasi yaşamda oynayabileceği rolü inceler ve izleyicileri korku, kırılma, yetkilendirme, özgür irade ve özgürlük gibi kavramları yeniden düşünmeye ve sorgulamaya teşvik ederek, sosyal hayatta kalma stratejileri olarak boyun eğme ve itaati ele alır. Documenta 11 (Almanya), Venedik (İtalya), Johannesburg (Güney Afrika), Sao Paulo (Brezilya), Shangai (Çin), Havana (Küba) ve Site Santa Fe (Amerika Birleşik Devletleri) de dahil olmak üzere birçok bienale katılmıştır. Eserleri The New Museum of Contemporary Art (Amerika Birleşik Devletleri); Chicago Çağdaş Sanat Müzesi (Amerika Birleşik Devletleri); Museum für Moderne Kunst (Almanya); Whitechapel Sanat Galerisi (İngiltere); Centro de Arte Contemporáneo Wifredo Lam (Küba) ve Museo Nacional de Bellas Artes (Küba) gibi birçok müze ve kurumda sergilenmiştir. 1998 yılında Guggenheim fellow (Amerika Birleşik Devletleri) olarak seçildi. 2000 yılında Prens Claus Ödülü'ne layık görüldü (Hollanda).

Jeremy Deller (İngiltere, 1966)

Jeremy Deller nesnelere çok deneyimler, olaylar ve müdahaleler üretmeye odaklanır. Courtauld Institute of Art'da sanat tarihi okudu. Enstalasyonları genellikle iddialı, sosyal konulara adanmış ve beklenmedik unsurlar taşır. Galeri dışında, sokaklarda çağdaş sanat dünyası ile ilişkilendirmek veya bağlar kurmak için kimileri işsiz madenciler, bir glam rock savaşı, savaş yaratma uzmanları gibi insanlarla ya da halkla çalışır. 2004 yılında Turner Ödülü'nü kazandı. Eserlerinin sergilendiği yerler arasında CA2M, Madrid; Palais de Tokyo, Paris; Camden Arts Center, Londra; New Museum, New York; Çağdaş Sanat Müzesi, Chicago; Manifesta 9, Genk; MOMA PS1, New York; Sao Paulo Bienali; Mori Sanat Müzesi, Tokyo; Tate Britain, Londra; 4. Berlin Bienali bulunmaktadır. Kendisi önümüzdeki Venedik Bienali'nde İngiliz Pavyonu'nda Birleşik Krallığı temsil edecek.

Leticia El Halli Obeid (İspanya, 1975)

Video, metin, çizim ve enstalasyon alanlarında çalışmaktadır. Leticia, Cordoba Ulusal Üniversitesi Sanat Okulu'nda okudu. 2001 yılında Atlantic Center for the Arts ve Cité Internationale des Arts, Paris'te misafir sanatçı olarak yer aldı. Açtığı en önemli sergiler arasında: Latin Amerika Video ve Dijital Sanat Bienali, Kosta Rika; 6. MERCOSUR Bienali, Porto Alegre; Arjantinliler Projesi, Montreal, Kanada bulunmaktadır. Venedik Bienali kapsamında Alfons Hug küratörlüğünde Italo Latin-Amerikan Enstitüsü, Latin Amerika Pavyonu'ndaki "Entre siempre y jamás" sergisi içinde "Dictados" adlı eserini sergiledi.

Jon Mikel Euba (İspanya, 1967)

Eserlerinin sürekli tekrarlanan parçalanmış sahneler ve karakterlerden oluşan kataloğu çizgi roman ve yeraltı sinemasına atıfta bulunur ve üretimini performans, video, enstalasyon ve çizimler ile gerçekleştirir. Euba üretimin kolektif anı ile ilgilenir ve bu anın tüm teknik ve estetik bileşenlerini inceler. 2002 yılında Fransa'da Altadis Plastik Sanatlar Ödülü'nü ve Bask Hükümeti'nce verilen Gure Artea ödülünü almıştır. Frankfurt Manifesta IV (Almanya), İstanbul Bienali (Türkiye), Venedik Bienali (İtalya) ve Busan Bienali (Güney Kore) katıldığı sergiler arasındadır. Performansları birçok başka yerin yanı sıra De Appel ve Amsterdam Stedelijk Museum Bureau'da, Dublin Project Arts Center'da, Şili'de Valparaíso Interventions'da, ve Eindhoven Van Abbe Müzesi'nde sunulmuştur.

Iain Forsyth ve Jane Pollard (İngiltere, 1973 / İngiltere, 1972)

Iain Forsyth & Jane Pollard kültürel ve sanat tarihinden olayları ve belgeleri tekrar canlandırmaları ile tanınır. Onların işleri canlılık, tekrarlama, arabuluculuk ve algının mekaniği üzerine soruşturmadır. Çalışmalarında müzik güçlü bir anımsatıcı düzenek olarak görülür. Bu, bilinç halindeki zihni yolundan saptırmak ve geçmiş zamanı şimdiki zaman içine sel gibi akıtmak için bir tür zaman yolculuğu olarak kullanılır. 2005 yılından bu yana Forsyth ve Pollard 60'lar ve 70'lerden, daha sonraki dönemlerin temel taşları olan video ve performans sanatı örneklerini yeniden ele aldıkları bir çalışma dizisi sürdürmekte. 2011 yılında Londra'daki ilk büyük sergileri South London Gallery'de gerçekleşti. Ocak 2012'de Samsung Sanat+ Ödülü için aday gösterildiler. Eserleri, aralarında Museum of Modern Art, New York; the Power Plant, Toronto; Art Basel, Miami Beach; Witte de With, Rotterdam; Apex Art, New York'un da bulunduğu pekçok mekanda sergilenmiştir.

Mario Garcia Torres (Meksika, 1975)

Slayt gösterileri, fotoğraf, enstalasyon, müdahaleler ve videolardan oluşan eserleri, yeniden yorumlamalar yoluyla tarihin geri kazanımı, yeniden anlamlandırılması, geçmişin gözden kaçan detaylar üzerinde yoğunlaşarak canlandırılması ve konu üzerine fikir yürütmeyi sağlayacak yeni açılımlar sunulması üzerinde odaklanmaktadır. Sanat tarihine ve özellikle de kavramsal sanat alanına özel bir ilgisi vardır. Garcia Torres Kaliforniya Berkeley Sanat Müzesi'nde, Zürih Kunsthalle'de, Londra Hoxton Square'deki White Cube'da, Tokyo Sora Galerisi'nde sergiler açmış ve katıldığı diğer birçok sergi arasında 2007 yılı Venedik Bienali ve Documenta 13 de bulunmaktadır.

Sanja Iveković (Hırvatistan, 1949)

Sanja Iveković 1949 yılında, halen çalışmakta ve yaşamakta olduğu Zagreb'de doğdu. 1968-1971 yılları arasında Zagreb Güzel Sanatlar Akademisi'nde okudu ve erken dönem feminist kavramsal sanatı ile geniş tanınırlık kazandı. Video, fotomontaj ve performans alanlarında bir öncü olan Ivekovic'in erken dönem çalışmaları 1970'lerde Yugoslavya'da sanatın toplum içindeki rolünü sorgulayan ve galerileri terk ederek, performanslar ve ucuz, kolayca ulaşılabilecek malzemeler kullanmayı tercih ederek sokaklara taşan ve bu sayede sanatsal alanı demokratikleştirmeye uğraşan bir sanatçı jenerasyonu olan "Nova Umjetnicka Praksa" (Yeni Sanat Uygulaması) ile bağlantılıdır. Yıllar boyu çalkantılı bir politik ortamda yaşamak ve çalışmak sosyal yapılar, toplumsa cinsiyet politikaları ve kimlik sorunsalı konularında sorgulamalara yol açmıştır. Iveković'in çıkış noktası kendi hayatı ve bir kadın olarak sosyal konumlandırılışı olup; kendisi her zaman kitle iletişiminin ve özellikle de iktidar politikalarının sosyalist ve post-sosyalist toplumlar üzerindeki yönlendirici etkilerine ilgi duymuştur. Kişisel sergileri arasında; The Disobedient (Neposlušni/e) [Asi], Galerija SC, Zagreb, Hırvatistan (2012); Visages du Langage [Dilin Çehreleri], Mac/Val, Fransa (2012); Waiting for the Revolution [Devrimi Beklerken], Mudam Luxembourg (2012); Sweet Violence [Tatlı Şiddet], MoMA, New York, (2011); Urgent Matters [Acil Konular], BAK Utrecht ve Van Abbemuseum, Eindhoven (2009); General Alert [Genel Alarm], Kölnischer Kunstverein, Köln (2007) bulunmaktadır. Katıldığı grup sergiler arasında da; Promises from the Past [Geçmişten Vaatler], Centre Pompidou, Paris (2012); Gender Check: Femininity and Masculinity in the Art of Eastern Europe [Cinsiyet Kontrolü: Doğu Avrupa Sanatında Kadınlık ve Erkeklik], Zacheta Ulusal Sanat Galerisi, Varşova (2010); After the Wall: Art in Post-Communist Europe [Duvardan Sonra: Komünizm Sonrası Avrupa'da Sanat], Ludwig Museum, Budapeşte (2000), ve 2000-2005 yılları arasında Viyana'daki Generali Foundation'da katıldığı pek çok sergi sayılabilir.

Martin Jenkinson (İngiltere, 1947-2012)

Martin Jenkinson İngiltere'deki politik ve endüstriyel mücadelenin son otuz yılını belgelemiş eskiden demir işçisi olan bir fotoğrafçıdır. Kendisi hayatta kalmak için savaştan metal işçilerini fotoğrafladı ve 1981 yılında Halkın İş için Yürüyüşü'nün resmi fotoğrafçısı oldu. Madenciler Ulusal Birliği'nin gazeteleri the Miner ve the Yorkshire Miner tarafından görevlendirildi ve 1984-85 maden kapatılmaları karşısındaki destansı grevin tam kalbinde yer aldı. Fotoğrafları İngiltere'de çeşitli ulusal gazetelerde basıldı.

Magdalena Leite (Uruguay, 1977)

Koreograf, dansçı, yönetmen ve besteci. Lisans eğitimini koreografi dalında ENDCC, CENART, Meksiko'da yaptı. Bir dansçı olarak "5 en punto" grubu ile Mary Minetti'nin (Uruguay) koreografilerini birleştirdi. Meksiko şehrinde diğer yönetmenlerin yanı sıra Serafín Aponte yönetiminde ve son zamanlarda Brezilyalı koreograf Alex Cassal ve Fransız tiyatro yönetmeni Julien Le Gargasson ile dans etti. 2008 yılında FONCA, Meksiko tarafından düzenlenen Birinci Latin Amerikalı Yaratıcılar Programına katılmak üzere seçildi. 2010 yılında mesleki gelişim için Viyana Uluslararası Dans Festivali (Impuls Tanz) tarafından verilen DanceWeb bursunu aldı. En önemli eserleri arasında "cuarenta noventa y seis", "7x1=7", "Tríptico II" ve "Cover" bulunmaktadır.

Jorge Méndez Blake (Meksika, 1974)

Çalışmaları bir kavramsal araç olarak edebiyat (eleştiri, söylem teorisi, veya yazarlar) ile yakından bağlantılıdır. Eserleri mimarlık, görsel sanatlar ve edebiyat arasındaki sınırların kaybolması ile tanımlandığı kadar yazı ve resim arasında gidip gelen bir dil oluşturmak üzere birbiri ile ilişkilendirilen sembolik anlar ya da hikayeler aracılığıyla biçimlenir. Genellikle, Méndez Blake'in eserlerinin edebi yönü argümanları kolayca tanınabilir olan bilinen eserler ve yazarlar ile ilgilidir. Ancak, sanatçının eserleri bu edebi göndermeler aracılığıyla izleyicileri metni hayalgücü yoluyla bu sürece kendi deneyimlerini ekleyerek tamamlamaya davet eder. Eserlerinin sergilendiği yerler arasında House On* (Madrid), Sala de Arte Publico Siqueiros, Museo Rufino Tamayo ve Museo de Arte Moderno (Meksiko Şehri); La Maison Rouge (Paris), Museo Nacional Centro de Arte Reina Sofía, Madrid, INTAR Gallery; Contemporary Art Arena Mexico, Guadalajara; Osaka Sky Binası, Osaka, Japonya; ve Jack Tilton Gallery, New York bulunmaktadır.

Fabio Morais (Brezilya, 1975)

Sınır ilişkileri konusuna yoğun ilgi duyan bir sanatçı-yazardır. İşlerinin çıkış noktası, ham maddesi ve aynı zamanda ürettiği sınırlı baskılar ve metinler çerçevesinde varış noktası kitaplardır. Onu en çok ilgilendiren, memleket ve millet kavramlarını dil açısından ele alarak dilin sınırlarını görünür hale getirmektir. 8. Porto Alegre Mercosur Bienali de dahil olmak üzere İspanya ve Brezilya'da pekçok sergi açmıştır.

Vicente Razo (Meksika, 1971)

Razo'nun işleri popüler kültür, siyaset ve sanatsal üretimin kesiştiği noktada yer alır ve çalışmaları buluntu nesnelere, baskılardan, ses kütüphanelerinin oluşturulmasına uzanan farklı türdeki platformlar üzerine oturur. Ulusal Özerk Meksika Üniversitesi'nde sanat okuduktan sonra yüksek lisansını New York Üniversitesi'nde Güzel Sanatlar alanında tamamlayarak Whitney Amerikan Müzesi'nde de bağımsız bir programa katıldı. Razo'nun eserleri Meksiko Şehri Müzesi; Los Angeles Contemporary Exhibitions; Dispatch, New York; MUAC, Meksiko Şehri; PS1 Contemporary Art, New York; South London Gallery; Circulo de Bellas Artes, Madrid; MALBA, Buenos Aires; ve Sao Paulo, Brezilya'daki Pinacoteca do Estado gibi çeşitli mekanlarda sergilendi.

Danh Vo (Vietnam, 1975)

Vietnam kökenli, ancak Danimarka'da büyüyen Vo, kişisel kimliği üzerinden rastgele seçtiği yerinden edilmişlik, vatandaşlık, bilinç ve hayal kırıklığı gibi küreselleşmiş dünyanın sorunlarını ele alan bir sanatçıdır. Kendisi sanat eserinin müellifliği ve kimliği konularını sorgulayarak; mülkiyet durumu ve kişisel ilişkilerin rolü hakkında sorular ortaya atmaktadır. Eserlerinin sergilendiği yerler arasında Kunsthalle Fridericianum, Kassel; Stedelijk Müzesi, Amsterdam; Singapur Bienali, Singapur; Galleria Civica DARTE Moderna e Contemporanea, Turin; Gwangju Bienali, Gwangju; 6. Berlin Bienali, Berlin; Witte de With, Rotterdam; Hamburger Bahnhof, Berlin; Manifesta 7 ve Güney Tirol, İtalya bulunmaktadır.

Ming Wong (Singapur, 1971)

Dünya sineması tarihine ve popüler eğlence formatlarına odaklanan iddialı performans ve videoları ile uluslararası tanınırlık kazanmış bir multimedya sanatçısıdır. Eserlerinde öznenin inşasının coğrafi konum ile ilişkisini ulusal kimlik, ırk, dil ve cinsiyet kavramlarını ele alan filmler ile bağlantılı olarak inceler. Eserleri Museum of Image, Queens, New York; Performa 11; Vitamin Creative Space, Guangzhou, Çin; Frye Sanat Müzesi, Seattle; Hara Çağdaş Sanat Müzesi; Tokyo ve Singapur Sanat Müzesi'nde yer aldı. Eserleri aynı zamanda Atelierhaus Monbijoupark, Berlin; 2010 Gwangju Bienali; ve 2009 yılında 53. Venedik Bienali için Singapur Pavyonu'nda sergilenmiştir. Berlin ve Singapur'da yaşıyor ve çalışıyor.

Artur Zmijewski (Polonya, 1966)

Zmijewski sanat ile siyaset ilişkisini araştırmak amacıyla fotoğraf ve film ile çalışır. Günümüz toplumunda sosyal normları, ahlak ve iktidar temsillerini araştırır ve sanatın bunlar üzerindeki etkileri ile ilgilenir. 7. Berlin Çağdaş Sanat Bienali'nin küratörlüğünü üstlenmiştir. Eserleri yaygın bir şekilde Moma, New York; 51. Venedik Bienali, Polonya Pavyonu, Venedik; Museo Universitario Arte Contemporaneo, Meksiko Şehri; Centro Cultural Banco do Nordeste do Brasil, Brezilya; Yerba Buena Sanat Merkezi, San Francisco; Berlin Martin Gropius Bau, Berlin; Jeu de Paume, Paris; Gwangju Bienali, 2010; Witte de With, Rotterdam; Galerija Miroslav Kraljevic, Zagreb; İstanbul Bienali, İstanbul; New Museum, New York gibi mekanlarda sergilenmiştir.

Rossella Biscotti (Italy, 1978)

She works primarily with moving images, performances, sculptures and text. Her work is related to topics found in the recent history of her country, the yearning for freedom and the control strategies used for power. She has participated in solo exhibitions at the CAC Vilnius (2012), Fondazione Galleria Civica di Trento (2010), and Nomas Foundation, Rome (2009), in addition to exhibitions in MAXXI National Museum of 21st Century Art, Rome (2010 - 11), Witte de With, Rotterdam (2010), Museu Serralves, Porto (2010), and Manifesta 9 (2012), Documenta 13 (2012). She received the Award Italia Arte Contemporanea in 2010.

Francois Bucher (Colombia, 1972)

In 1999 and 2000 Bucher attended the Whitney Independent Study Program in New York. In 1999 he finished his Master at The Art Institute of Chicago where he received an award for his thesis. He has received several awards, including the first prize in VideoEx, 2003, Zurich; Prime Videocreation Award in Latin America; and the Werkleitz Prize, Transmediale 2004 in Berlin. Some of his video works have been included in the Rotterdam Film Festival, Transmediale, Berlin, 2004, 2005; The New York Video Festival at Lincoln Center, 2002; and the Turner Prize Film Program at The Tate Gallery, London, 2002. His video work constantly engages the construction of power, as well as history, politics, and the crossing from motion picture film to television. He lives and works in Berlin.

Tania Bruguera (Cuba, 1968)

Through an interdisciplinary practice spanning installation, social intervention and most prominently performance, Bruguera explores the role art can play in daily political life, encouraging viewers to rethink and question notions of fear, vulnerability, empowerment, self-determination and freedom, as well as submission and obedience as social survival strategies. She participated in Documenta 11 (Germany) as well as in several biennales such as Venice (Italy), Johannesburg (South Africa), Sao Paulo (Brazil), Shanghai (China), Havana (Cuba), and Site Santa Fe (United States.) Her work has also been exhibited at The New Museum of Contemporary Art (United States); The Museum of Contemporary Art of Chicago (United States); Museum für Moderne Kunst (Germany); The Whitechapel Art Gallery (England); Centro de Arte Contemporáneo Wifredo Lam (Cuba) and Museo Nacional de Bellas Artes (Cuba). In 1998 she was selected as a Guggenheim fellow (United States). In 2000 she received the Prince Claus Prize (The Netherlands.)

Jeremy Deller (UK, 1966)

Jeremy Deller focuses on producing experiences, events and interventions rather than objects. He studied art history at the Courtauld Institute of Art. His installations are usually ambitious, socially committed and unexpected. He works on the streets outside the gallery, with public or people that he tries to link or associate with the contemporary art world, some of them unemployed miners, a glam rock fighter, experts in creations of battles, etc. He won the Turner Prize in 2004. He has exhibited widely including at CA2M, Madrid, Palais de Tokyo, Paris, Camden Arts Center, London, New Museum, New York, Museum of Contemporary Art, Chicago, Manifesta 9, Genk, MOMA PS1, New York, Sao Paulo Biennale, Mori Art Museum, Tokyo, Tate Britain, London, 4th Berlin Biennale. He will represent UK in the 'British Pavilion' of the forthcoming Venice Biennale.

Leticia El Halli Obeid (Spain, 1975)

She works with video, text, drawing and installation. Leticia studied at the Art School of the National University of Cordoba. She was the artist in residence on the Atlantic Center for the Arts in 2001 and in the Cité Internationale des Arts, Paris. Among her main exhibitions we find: Latin American Video and Digital Art Biennial in Costa Rica, 6th MERCOSUR Biennial, Porto Alegre, The Argentinean Project Montreal, in Canada. She presented her work "Dictados" inside the exhibition "Entre siempre y jamás", curated by Alfons Hug for the Latin American Pavilion of the Italo Latin-American Institute within the Venice Biennale.

Jon Mikel Euba (Spain, 1967)

He works with performance, video, installation and drawing from which he produces a catalogue of fragmented scenes and characters that refer mainly to comics and underground cinema and that recur constantly in his work. Euba is interested in the collective moment of production and investigates all its technical and esthetic components. In 2002 he received the Altadis Prize of Plastic Arts in France and the award Gure Artea of the Basque Government. He has participated in the Frankfurt Manifesta IV (Germany), the Istanbul Biennial (Turkey), the Venice Biennale (Italy) and the Busan Biennale (South Korea), among others. His performances have been presented at De Appel and the Amsterdam Stedelijk Museum Bureau, at the Dublin Project Arts Center, at the Valparaiso Interventions of this Chilean city, at the Van Abbe Museum in Eindhoven, among others.

Iain Forsyth & Jane Pollard (UK, 1973 / UK, 1972)

Iain Forsyth & Jane Pollard are known for their recreations of cultural and art historical events and documents. Theirs is an enquiry into the mechanics of liveness, repetition, mediation and reception. Music is a potent mnemonic device in their work. It is used as a form of time-travel, to derail the conscious mind and bring the past flooding into the present. Since 2005 Forsyth & Pollard have pursued an ongoing series re-working seminal video and performance art of the 60's and 70's. In 2011 their first major exhibition in London was presented at the South London Gallery. They were nominated for the Samsung Art+ Prize in January 2012. They have shown extensively including at the Museum of Modern Art, New York, the Power Plant, Toronto, Art Basel Miami Beach, Witte de With, Rotterdam, Apex Art New York, among others.

Mario Garcia Torres (México, 1975)

His work consists on slide shows, photography, installations, interventions and videos that address the recovery of history through new reinterpretations, that re-semanticize and invigorate history, delving into the details unnoticed and opening possibilities for reflection. He has a particular interest in art history, especially in conceptual art. Garcia Torres has been in exhibitions at the Berkeley Museum of Art of California, in the Kunsthalle of Zurich, at the Cube Hoston Square of London, at the Sora Gallery of Tokyo and he participated in the Venice Biennale in 2007 and Documenta 13 among many others.

Sanja Iveković (Croatia, 1949)

Sanja Iveković was born in 1949, in Zagreb where she currently lives and works. She studied at the Zagreb Academy of Fine Arts from 1968 to 1971 and became widely known for her early feminist conceptual work. A pioneer in video, photomontage and performance, her early practice was associated with the 1970s' 'Nova Umjetnicka Praksa' (New Art Practice), a generation of artists in Yugoslavia who questioned the role of art in society and strove to democratise artistic space by abandoning galleries and taking to the streets through performances and the use of cheap, accessible materials. Living and working in a turbulent political context for many years brought forth questions regarding social structures, gender politics and identity. Iveković's point of departure has been her own life and social positioning as a woman, always interested in the influence of the mass media as well as the politics of power in the contexts of socialist and post-socialist society. Selected solo exhibitions include: The Disobedient (Neposlusni/e), Galerija SC, Zagreb, Croatia (2012), Visages du Langage, Mac/Val, France (2012); Waiting for the Revolution, Mudam Luxembourg (2012); Sweet Violence, MoMA, New York, (2011); Urgent Matters, BAK Utrecht and the Van Abbemuseum, Eindhoven (2009); General Alert, Kölnischer Kunstverein, Cologne (2007). Selected group exhibitions include: Promises from the Past, Centre Pompidou, Paris (2012); Gender Check: Femininity and Masculinity in the Art of Eastern Europe, Zacheta National Gallery of Art, Warsaw (2010); After the Wall: Art in Post-Communist Europe, Ludwig Museum, Budapest (2000), and several shows at the Generali Foundation in Vienna from 2000-2005.

Martin Jenkinson (UK, 1947-2012)

Martin Jenkinson was a former steelworker turned photographer who covered the political and industrial struggle in Britain over the last three decades. He captured steelworkers as they fought for survival, and was the official photographer on the People's March for Jobs, in 1981. He was commissioned by the National Union of Mineworkers' newspapers the Miner and the Yorkshire Miner, and was at the heart of the epic strike against pit closures of 1984-85. His images appeared in many UK national newspapers.

Magdalena Leite (Uruguay, 1977)

Choreographer, dancer, director and composer. Holds a Bachelor in Choreography by the ENDCC, CENART, México. As a dancer she integrated the group "5 en punto" with choreographies of Mary Minetti (Uruguay). In México she has danced under the direction of Serafín Aponte, among others, and recently under the direction of the brazilian choreographer Alex Cassal and the french theater director Julien Le Gargasson. In 2008 she was chosen to participate in the First Creators Residence of Latin America of FONCA, México. In 2010 she received the DanceWeb scholarship for professional improvement inside of the Vienna International Dance Festival (ImPuls Tanz.) Some of her most important pieces are "cuarenta noventa y seis", "7x1=7", "Tríptico II" y "Cover".

Jorge Méndez Blake (México, 1974)

His work is closely linked to literature (criticism, discourse theory, or writers), which is used as a conceptual tool. His work is characterized by the disappearance of borders between architecture, visual arts and literature, as well as by symbolic moments or stories that are linked together to create a language that oscillates between writing and painting. Usually, the literary aspect of Méndez Blake's work is related to known works and writers whose arguments can be easily recognized. However, the artist's works through these literary references, invite the viewers to complete the text through the imagination, which adds to this process their own experiences. He has shown in House On* (Madrid), Sala de Arte Publico Siqueiros, Museo Rufino Tamayo and Museo de Arte Moderno (Mexico City); La Maison Rouge, (Paris) Museo Nacional Centro de Arte Reina Sofía, Madrid, INTAR Gallery; Contemporary Art Arena Mexico, Guadalajara; Osaka Sky Building, Osaka, Japan; Jack Tilton Gallery, New York City, among others.

Fabio Morais (Brasil, 1975)

He is an artist-writer enthusiastic about border relations. Books are his starting point, raw materials, and also the end point, in the case of editions and texts he produces. What interests him most is to think the notions of territory and nation from the perspective of language making visible the boundaries of language. He has exhibited extensively specially In Spain and Brazil including the 8th Biennial of Mercosur in Porto Alegre.

Vicente Razo (México, 1971)

Razo's work is located at the intersection between popular culture, politics and artistic production, his practice lands on different kinds of platforms, from readymades prints to the creation of audio libraries. He studied art in the National Autonomous University of Mexico, he has a master in Fine Arts at the New York University and attended the independent program of the Whitney American Museum. Razo has shown his work in the Mexico City Museum, Los Angeles Contemporary Exhibitions and Dispatch New York, MUAC, Mexico City, PS1 Contemporary Art, New York ; South London Gallery; Circulo de Bellas Artes, Madrid, MALBA Buenos Aires; the Pinacoteca do Estado in Sao Paulo, Brasil among others.

Danh Vo (Vietnam, 1975)

Of Vietnamese origin, but raised in Denmark, Vo is an artist who addresses random issues of his personal identity in a globalized world, such as displacement, citizenship, consciousness and frustration. He questions the authorship and identity of the artwork and raises questions about the status of property and the role of personal relationships. He has shown his work widely at Kunsthalle Fridericianum, Kassel Stedelijk Museum, Amsterdam Singapore Biennale, Singapore, Galleria Civica d'Arte Moderna e Contemporanea, Turin, Gwangju Biennale, Gwangju, 6th. Berlin Biennale, Berlin, Witte de With, Rotterdam, Hamburger Bahnhof, Berlin, Manifesta 7, South Tyrol, Italy, among others.

Ming Wong (Singapore, 1971)

Multimedia artist who has been internationally recognized for his ambitious performance and video works devoted to the history of world cinema and popular forms of entertainment. In his work he considers the means by which subjectivity is constructed in relation to the geographic location of the films investigating the notions of national identity, racial, linguistic and gender. He has exhibited in the Museum of Image, Queens, New York, as part of Performa 11, Vitamin Creative Space, Guangzhou, China, the Frye Art Museum, Seattle, Hara Museum of Contemporary Art in Tokyo and the Singapore Art Museum. He has also been included in exhibitions in Atelierhaus Monbijoupark in Berlin, the Gwangju Biennale 2010, and in 2009 at the Singapore Pavilion for the 53rd Venice Biennale. He lives and works in Berlin and Singapore.

Artur Zmijewski (Poland, 1966)

Zmijewski works with photography and film to explore the relation of art with politics. He investigates social norms, morality and representations of power in today's society and the effects that art have on it. He was the curator of the 7th Berlin Biennale for Contemporary Art. He has exhibited widely including at Moma, New York, The Polish Pavillion, 51 Biennale di Venezia, Venice, Museo Universitario Arte Contemporaneo, Mexico City, Centro Cultural Banco do Nordeste do Brasil, Yerba Buena Center for the Arts, San Francisco, Berlin Martin Gropius Bau, Berlin, Jeu de Paume, Paris, Gwangju Biennale 2010, Witte de With, Rotterdam, Galerija Miroslav Kraljevic, Zagreb, Istanbul Biennial, Istanbul, New Museum, New York, among others.

Sergi tasarımı için Cecilia Pardo ve kûratoryal asistanlık için Maylen Bourget ve Freida Calcáneo'ya teşekkürler.
Thanks to Cecilia Pardo for exhibition design and Maylen Bourget & Freida Calcáneo for curatorial assistance.

AKBANK SANAT / AKBANK ART CENTER
İstiklal Caddesi No: 8
34435 Beyoğlu, İstanbul
T: (0212) 252 35 00/01
www.akbanksanat.com

KÜRATÖR / CURATOR
Alejandra Labastida

METİN / TEXT
Alejandra Labastida
José Luis Barrios
Guillermo Santamarina

ÇEVİRİ / TRANSLATION
Yiğit Adam
Leyla Ayaş
Christopher Fraga

TASARIM / DESIGN
Publicis Yorum

BASKI / PRINT
İmak Ofset
Merkez Mah. Atatürk Cad. Göl Sok. No: 1
Yenibosna 34192 Bahçelievler / İstanbul
T: (0212) 656 49 97

